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1. INTRODUCTION: THE RISE OF THE DIGITAL IDENTITY INTERMEDIARY
In late 2011, Salman Rushdie found himself in a unique and novel situation
which was both surprising and annoying: he was required to prove that he
indeed was Salman Rushdie, the famous author-a task he initially failed!' This
identity-based dispute began when Facebook suspected that the person behind
the "Salman Rushdie" Facebook page was not the famous author.2 Thus, it
requested that the live persona operating the profile (indeed, Rushdie himself)
provide proof of identity. Rushdie, however, was unable to prove that his first
name was "Salman." 3 His first name, which he rarely uses, is "Ahmed" (Salman
is his middle name).4 Therefore, Facebook ordered that the Facebook page was
I Somini Sengupta, Naming Names: Rushdie Wins Facebook Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
15, 2011, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/technology/hiding-or-
using-your-name-online-and-who-decides.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
2 d.
3
4Id
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to be renamed "Ahmed Rushdie."5 The infuriated Rushdie blasted Facebook via
his Twitter account.6 Two hours later, Facebook conceded. (Ahmed) Salman
Rushdie was again controlling the "Salman Rushdie" Facebook profile.7
The former St. Louis Cardinals' Manager Tony LaRussa felt the sting of
novel identity-related conflicts from a somewhat different angle. LaRussa
learned of a Twitter account bearing his name and posting tasteless tweets.8 He
then moved to sue Twitter on several accounts (including trademark
infringement, cybersquatting, and misappropriation). 9 The problematic profile
was eventually removed and the case apparently settled (although the details of
this settlement are disputed).' 0 Similar stories regarding the hardship of
individuals whose identities were manipulated or hijacked are often reported by
the press." Claims and suits against content platforms and dating services12
which enabled these abuses were set forth, with limited success.
The rise of identity-based disputes should come as no surprise. Individuals
are spending a great deal of time in online realms. They are engaging in
commerce and participating in the social discourse.' 3 This is all occurring in a
variety of novel settings: through the use of social networking sites, virtual
worlds, and peer-to-peer networks to name a few.14 Users are carrying out these
activities by using their desktop and laptop computers, tablets, and smartphones.
5 Id.
6d
7 Sengupta, supra note 1, at Al. When addressing similar issues, James Grimmelmann
sums up these forms of situations while noting that "[t]hese victims thus find themselves
trapped in the Kafkaesque position of being unable to prove that they really are themselves,
to the satisfaction of a business that has already shown itself incapable of correctly telling
who they are." James Grimmelmann, Known and Unknown, Property and Contract:
Comments on Hoofnagle andMoringiello, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 85, 88 (2010).
8 LaRussa v. Twitter, Inc., DIGITAL MEDIA L. PROJECT (May 29, 2009),
http://www.dmlp.org/threats/la-russa-v-twitter-inc#description.
9 Id.
10 Id
' 'For a heartbreaking story featuring an author tormented by a fake profile, see Susan
Arnout Smith, The Fake Facebook Profile I Could Not Get Removed, SALON (Feb. 1, 2011,
8:39 PM), http://www.salon.com/2011/02/02/my_fakefacebookprofile/. For an alarming
story featuring the impersonation of a top NATO Commanding Officer (probably by
Chinese hackers sponsored by the state), see David Meyer, Top NA TO Officer Impersonated
on Facebook, ZDNET (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.zdnet.com/top-nato-officer-imperson
ated-on-facebook-4010025604/; see also Helen A.S. Popkin, 2 Girls, Ages 12 and 13, Face
Felony for Fake Facebook Account, NBC NEWS (July 30, 2012, 5:05 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/2-girls-ages- 12-13-face-felony-fake-facebook-
account-916555. For additional references to impostors of both celebrities (such as Prince
William and Sarah Palin) and others, see Shannon N. Sterritt, Comment, Applying the
Common-Law Cause of Action Negligent Enablement of Imposter Fraud to Social
Networking Sites, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1695, 1698 (2011).
12See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122, 1125 (9th Cir.
2003).
13 Sengupta, supra note 1, at Al.
141d. at A3.
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Moreover, they will soon be able to do so with their glasses!' 5 Therefore, users
are creating and investing a great deal of social capital in their online identities.
Given this massive investment, many users hold their online identity as dear to
them, both financially and emotionally. For them, the implications of losing
control over, harming, or wrongfully assuming their online identity are dire.
Such loss of control carries with it overall negative social implications as well.
While both technology and market forces provide responses to these emerging
problems,' 6 the law is destined to play an important role in resolving these
novel forms of disputes. Such disputes are making their way to the courts and
the regulator's attention,17 and even generating novel terms of art, such as "e-
personation" and "catfishing."' 8 This Article strives to introduce and map out
some initial strategies for addressing these novel legal matters.19
While the problems and tensions noted address a variety of plaintiffs,
defendants, and victims, they often involve the actions of a handful of identity
intermediaries.20 Indeed, as a greater portion of our lives migrates to the digital
realm, many of our interactions are made possible by powerful intermediaries. 21
The digital realm has led to the emergence of several powerful platforms which
enable the publication, sharing, and distribution of content, as well as facilitate
15 See How It Feels, GOOGLE GLASS, http://www.google.com/glass/start/how-it-feels/
(last visited July 12, 2013).
16 Sengupta, supra note 1, at A3.
17 Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1121, 1125.
18 Zimmerman v. Bd. of Trs. of Ball State Univ., No. 1:12-cv-01475-JMS-DML, 2013
WL 1619532, at *14 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 15, 2013).
19 The discussion noted in the text is closely linked to a recent doctrinarian movement
of legal "revitalization" of the right to identity in the EU. See CLARE SULLIVAN, DIGITAL
IDENTITY 19-39 (2011); Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, Right to Personal Identity: The
Challenges of Ambient Intelligence and the Need for a New Legal Conceptualization, in
COMPUTERS, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION: AN ELEMENT OF CHOICE 65, 66-69, 94
(Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2011); Roger Brownsword, Friends, Romans, Countrymen: Is
There a Universal Right to Identity?, 2 L. INNOVATION & TECH. 223, 224-26 (2009);
Giorgio Pino, The Right to Personal Identity in Italian Private Law: Constitutional
Interpretation and Judge-Made Rights, in THE HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW
225, 225-26, 233-37 (Mark Van Hoecke & Frangois Ost eds., 2000); Elad Oreg, Right to
Information Identity 4-24 (Oct. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://works.bepress.com/elad oreg/l; Paul De Hert, A Right to Identity To Face the Internet
of Things, UNESCO 5-10, http://portal.unesco.org/ci/fr/files/25857/12021328273deHert-
Paul.pdf/de%2BHert-Paul.pdf (last visited July 17, 2013). For a very recent argument in
favor of recognizing the right to identity in the United States, see Clare Sullivan, Digital
Identity, Privacy and the Right to Identity in the United States ofAmerica, 29 COMPUTER L.
& SECURITY REV. 348, 349 (2013).
20 It appears this term was coined by Chris Hoofnagle, as mentioned in Sengupta, supra
note 1, at A3.
21 Oreg, supra note 19, at 10-11 ("With the evolving of the Web the range of
intermediaries has become more sophisticated, partisan, and interest motivated, including:
access providers, search and filter services, name managers, content hosts, communities'
administrators, database operators and others. They can all determine what information-
including identity-related information-will be kept, verified, accessed and disseminated.").
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and even control the rich public discussions and discourses that are unfolding.
Yet the examples mentioned illustrate the rise of the new role of identity
intermediation, i.e., the process of creating, authenticating, verifying, and
guiding stable identities through which we interact, send, and receive
information online, as well as structure our identity and persona. With this new
social and technological role, duties and responsibilities for these new
intermediaries are sure to follow-and with that, legal liability. This Article
focuses its attention on the role law must play in shaping the conduct and
behavior of these identity intermediaries.
The law can respond to the rise of these intermediaries and the disputes they
generate in several ways. One dominant strategy is that of limited responses-
sitting on the sidelines and allowing social, economic, and technological forces
to guide the identity intermediaries and their users toward optimal and socially
acceptable outcomes. Such a strategy indeed might make sense in an innovative
and ever-changing environment. To a great extent, that is the path currently
taken by U.S. law. This path is enabled by a strategy of deference to the one-
sided standard form contracts set forth by the intermediary. It is further
supplemented by the blanket immunity provided by Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (CDA) to the intermediaries' role as publishers,
which can be applied to the identity intermediation context.22 Indeed some of
the most (in)famous Section 230 cases involved impersonation and abuse of
identity intermediation. Here, the court upheld the broad protection the CDA
provides content providers in their capacity as identity intermediaries and
limited their exposure to the users'/plaintiffs' claims.23 In short, current U.S.
law mostly takes a non-intervening approach which merely protects the
contractual and property rights of the intermediaries and allows them to
voluntarily govern these virtual realms.24 The first two examples noted above
(as well as many others) demonstrate how identity intermediaries are doing so,
with relative success. 25
The United States' immunity-based strategy for regulating digital
intermediaries has been the subject of endless debates.26 Academics have
discussed the pros and cons of the overall immunity Section 230 provides, while
noting its vast benefits to both free speech and innovation policy. 27 The global
dominance of various U.S.-based online ventures (and the paucity of notable
22 Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996).
23 See discussion of Carafano infra notes 186-189.
24 See discussion infra notes 186-189.
25 Sengupta, supra note 1, at Al.
2 6 DAWN C. NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE SPEECH IN THE
INTERNET AGE 11-87, 135-51 (2009); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION 105-
88 (2007); JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET-AND How To STOP IT 101-
26, 175-234 (2008); Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary
Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 293, 295-97, 328-49 (2011).27 NUNZIATO, supra note 26.
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online ventures from other parts of the world)28 might perhaps indicate the
successful outcome of opting for this legal strategy. On the other hand, the
current legal setting provides limited protection of users' identity, privacy, and
autonomy interests.29 Such users, when harmed by speech-related torts
generated in the digital realm, can only pursue the primary tortfeasor (who is
often cloaked in anonymity) or rely upon the good graces of the relevant
intermediary to limit their damages or even punish wrongdoers. 30 A discussion
as to the proper regulation of identity intermediaries must clearly echo the
arguments set forth within this broader discussion. However, this Article finds
that the context of identity intermediation calls for a specific set of
considerations, balances, and possibly legal rules. For that reason, it proposes an
innovative legal taxonomy for addressing the process of identity intermediation.
In addition, it moves to inquire whether courts and regulators must take a more
proactive stand in resolving these novel disputes and defining the role of these
powerful identity players.
Given the fact that the U.S. legal response to regulating identity
intermediaries is relatively clear (though possibly wrong),31 the Article looks to
existing and possibly future EU legislative efforts aimed at regulating identity
intermediaries on several dimensions as possible points of inspiration. In
Europe, identity intermediaries of a different form are regulated by the E-
Signature ("eSig") Directive, which is currently going through a major revision
process.32 EU policymakers are further considering expanding these rules to a
broader set of identity intermediaries. 33 This Article will examine the eSig
Directive's unique features, as well as its unimpressive track record, and the
reasons and implications of its relative failures. Understanding these failures
will assist us in understanding the limits of such a regulatory framework, should
we choose to expand it to all identity intermediaries-including social
networking sites and micro-blogging platforms.
Although this aspect of our study might seem Euro-centric, this analytical
inquiry should be of great interest to U.S. readers. As with other recent U.S.-
originated academic projects examining the intricacies of recent EU initiatives,
this study will inquire what U.S. regulators and market participants can learn
28 European Commission JRC Technical Reports, Comparing Innovation Performance
in the EU and the USA: Lessons from Three ICT Sub-Sectors, 3, JRC 81448 (2013) (Simon
Forge et al.), available at ftp://ftp.jrc.es/pub/EURdoc/EURdoc/JRC81448.pdf.
29Wu, supra note 26, at 294-95. See generally Omer Tene, Privacy Law's Midlife
Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the Second Wave of Global Privacy Laws, 74 OHIO ST. L.J.
1217 (2013).30 SOLOVE, supra note 26, at 186-87.3 1 NUNZIATO, supra note 26; Wu, supra note 26, at 295-97, 328-49.32 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions in the Internal
Market, at 2, COM (2012) 238 final (Apr. 6, 2012).
33 Id.
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from the EU's experience. 34 Indeed the U.S. Government is contemplating a
number of novel steps which greatly resemble those discussed across the
pond.35 Thus, learning of the EU experiences and discussions will surely prove
helpful in this limited context, as well as when contemplating the proper form
of identity intermediary regulation.
The Article proceeds as follows. Following this introduction (Part I), Part II
provides the background and terminology for understanding the role of identity
intermediaries in the digital age. It maps out the various forms of identity
intermediation-from the state, through the creation of electronic IDs ("elDs"),
until the recent rise of "soft elD" intermediaries. These are defined as entities
which provide for identity intermediation online, yet do so incidentally,
remotely, and in a lightly regulated environment. Part III moves to further
address the specific traits of soft elD intermediation. It notes intermediation
which generates either ipse or idem identities. The former ("ipse") refers to a
digital identity initiated by the relevant individual. 36 The latter ("idem")
addresses instances in which others collect and rely upon information pertaining
to an individual.37 This Article chooses to focus on the former category.
Thereafter, the Article distinguishes between intermediations which rely upon
the use of "Real Names" and "Stable Pseudonyms"-each category employing
a different set of technologies and verification methods, and generating unique
benefits and concerns.
In Part IV, we explore the benefits and risks of soft elD intermediation.
Identity intermediation promotes economic interests, as well as those related to
personality and identity. It also enhances autonomy and promotes free speech.38
However, such intermediaries might generate serious concerns. The integrity of
soft elDs might be compromised. 39 They might be hacked, used for
impersonation or identity misrepresentation. 40 In addition, the intermediaries
might use the power they are vested with excessively, by terminating accounts,
or limiting their interoperability and mobility.41 The analysis notes the parties
affected, while drawing from recent events addressed by courts and the press.
This Part ends by addressing possible legal responses, while noting the option
34 See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions
and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REv. 1966, 1976 (2013).
35 See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR TRUSTED IDENTITIES IN
CYBERSPACE 1 (Apr. 2011) [hereinafter NSTIC REPORT], available at http://www.white
house.gov/sites/default/files/rssviewer/NSTICstrategy 041511 .pdf.
36 Mireille Hildebrandt, Profiling and the Identity of the European Citizen, in
PROFILING THE EUROPEAN CITIZEN 303, 312-13 (Mireille Hildebrandt & Serge Gutwirth
eds., 2008).
37 Id.
3 8 SOLOVE, supra note 26, at 125-60.
39 Paul Bernal, The Right to Online Identity 13 (Sept. 7, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-2143138.40 d.
41 See, e.g., Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, #§ 5, 9,
https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited July 16, 2013).
2013] 1341
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of a limited, responsive, and strategic role for law. Seeking the proper role of
law, Part V introduces readers to several related regulatory frameworks, namely
the EU eSig Directive. This Directive made use of both the regulatory and
strategic responses.42 We then examine two novel governmental steps in the
United States and the EU, which closely coincide with some of the eSig
Directive general themes. These legal frameworks provide important insights
when considering the proper legal regime to be used to regulate soft elD
intermediaries.
On the basis of these interesting insights, Part VI provides
recommendations for legal responses. Here, the Article examines a variety of
policy moves which pertain to soft elD intermediaries, such as requiring
mandatory approval, setting up a voluntary accreditation system, and assigning
tort liability. The Article generally rejects the first two options, and thereafter
closely examines whether and how tort liability should normatively be assigned
to these powerful intermediaries. It does so while distinguishing among
different methods of intermediation (Real Names vs. Stable Pseudonyms) as
well as the different concerns noted in Part IV (ID hijacking, impersonation,
and identity misrepresentation). The analysis thus generates a two-by-three
liability matrix. Finally, this Part examines the role law should take in curbing
the intermediaries' excessive ability to impede on the individual's identity
interests. It addresses the optimal ways law should encourage mobility and
interoperability, as well as other educational roles which will prove constructive
in this context. We provide several concluding remarks regarding future
research and broader legal questions in Part VII.
II. IDENTITY INTERMEDIATION: "HARD" EIDS/"SOFT" EIDS
A. From IDs to elDs
How can I prove I am who I say I am? In the olden days, when individuals
lived in small communities and stayed put for most of their lives, meeting this
task was trivial. Members of society recognized each other while relying on
various physical traits, as they interacted with almost the same people
throughout the course of their lives. But as society moved toward urbanization,
greater mobility, and overall complexity, identification 43 became a greater
4 2 See generally Directive 1999/93/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 13 December 1999 on a Community Framework for Electronic Signatures, 1999 O.J. (L
13) 12 [hereinafter Directive 1999/93/EC].
43 The term "identity" is quite difficult to define. James Fearon notes fourteen (!)
different definitions for this term. James D. Fearon, What Is Identity (as We Now Use the
Word)? 4-5, 7 (Nov. 3, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.stanford.
edu/~jfearon/papers/idenlv2.pdf. Generally, the word refers both to the "similarity" among
factors (they are "identical") as well as the sense of self. See Hildebrandt, supra note 36, at
312. The context discussed here is of"sameness"--that the individual identified at one point
is the same as the one identified later. Steven Davis refers to this as the epistemological
1342 [Vol. 74:6
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challenge. Trusted intermediaries were called upon to enable identification in a
variety of settings.
The most natural identity intermediary was (and still is) the State.44 The
state issued identification measures early on so as to provide travel documents
(passports),45 allow for the fair allocation of benefits (the Social Security
card),46 and vouch that an individual was permitted to engage in specific,
regulated activities such as driving, hunting, or carrying firearms (by issuing
driver's and gun licenses, as well as hunting permits).47 The state provided an
authenticating document, which could not be easily forged.48 The document
would be issued after interacting with the individual in person (at least initially)
and relying upon other official documents he or she obtained.49 These processes
are addressed by a variety of relevant laws and regulations and remain outside
the scope of the current discussion.50
With time, private entities began commanding crucial and strategic roles in
society. To meet their obligations and achieve their goals, these entities are
required to engage in identity intermediation as well. Banks and credit card
companies, for example, issue various cards which allow individuals to
withdraw funds, engage in transactions, and draw credit.51 These cards are
identification instruments which signal to the relevant institute or merchant that
funds should be provided and transactions executed. 52 At times, other entities
(be they public or private) might rely on these privately issued means of
identifications to verify the identity of an individual as well.53 For instance,
states rely upon these private forms of identification for voter identification
(traditionally a public/governmental role). 54
Upon entering the information age, the identity intermediation role faces
intriguing opportunities and challenges. The Internet and other measures of
cheap communications allow firms to reach out to customers around the globe,
meaning of identity. Steven Davis, A Conceptual Analysis ofldentity, in LESSONS FROM THE
IDENTITY TRAIL 213, 219 (Ian Kerr et al. eds., 2009).
44 Fearon, supra note 43, at 4.
45 Davis, supra note 43, at 219-21.
46 Id at 223-24.
47 Id at 222.
48 Id at 220.
4 9 Id.
50 For a lengthy philosophical analysis of the process of verifying identity through the
use of passport control, see id at 219-20.
51 Davis, supra note 43, at 221-22.
521d
53 Id. at 222.
54 See Voter Identification Requirements, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/voter-id.aspx (last updated June 27,
2013) for a list of voting ID requirements. For instance, in several states bank statements or
utility bills with the voter's name and address count as means of identification (see Alabama,
Alaska, and others). Id. Also note, for instance, that Arizona allows for reliance on a vehicle
insurance card and that Florida allows for the use of a credit or debit card. Id.
2013] 1343
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regardless of physical borders and impediments. Yet these interactions do not
provide for identification along the lines on which society has operated in
previous generations. The information age enables virtual encounters in which
physical cues, traits, and documents used for identification in the past are now
unavailable or costly. In some instances, even allowing for a one time, very
brief, physical interaction with an individual is very difficult to achieve. This
reality generates a need for novel ways of authentication and, with it,
opportunities for new forms of identity intermediation-the electronic
identification intermediaries-or elD providers. Yet such intermediaries must
first figure out how authentication could be achieved in a way that is secure,
efficient, cheap, and simple.
It was at this point-the dawn of the digital age-when the EU stepped in
to introduce the eSig Directive.55 This Directive is premised upon the
understanding that a novel form of elD intermediaries would (and should)
arise.56 The Directive and the EU Member States' laws that followed moved to
facilitate, regulate, and even motivate these forms of intermediaries.57 These
envisioned intermediaries were intended to assist in carrying out identified or
authenticated online interactions.58 To do so, an intermediary will authenticate
the identity of an individual upon issuance.59 Most commonly, such
authentication will initially be carried out in person, while relying on acceptable
measures of authentication, such as a national ID, passport, driver's license, and
photograph (or other biometric means of identification). Thereafter, the
individual is issued a technological measure (usually a smartcard). 60 Together
with a password, the individual uses these measures to achieve two objectives:
(1) indicate that he or she is the author of a relevant text or carried out a specific
action, and (2) indicate that a relevant text was not tampered with. 61 Other
variations of this method exist, while relying on different business methods and
modes of identification and technology (including various ways of using
biometrics). 62 These intermediaries, the EU regulators believed, would lead to
the fulfillment of the promise the digital age brought about: an international (or
at least pan-European) marketplace of trusted transactions, and customers who
are not deterred by the risks of remote transactions. 63 For the remainder of this
55 Directive 1999/93/EC, supra note 42, at 12.56 1d
57I
58Id.
59 Commission Report of I5 March 2006 on the Operation ofDirective 1999/93/EC on
a Community Framework for Electronic Signatures, at 6, COM (2006) 120 final (Mar. 15,
2006).
60 For a discussion of the high percentage of smartcard usage, see Jos DUMORTIER ET
AL., THE LEGAL AND MARKET ASPECTS OF ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES 127 (2003), available at
http://skilriki.is/media/skjol/electronic sig report.pdf.
61 Commission Report, supra note 59.62 Id.
63 Id. at 4.
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discussion, we will refer to these forms of identification as "hard elDs"-they
are mainly initiatives which strive to duplicate the offline world's level of
security and authenticity in the online realm. 64 It is also important to note that
laws governing elDs were introduced in the United States (and are commonly
referred to as "digital signature laws").65 These state laws mostly address the
extent of the validity of using such technologies, especially when compared to
laws which present actual signature requirements. 66
Yet, the intermediaries envisioned by regulators staggered. 67 Beyond
limited contexts (such as e-government and banking), the business models
which were meant to facilitate these measures rarely got off the ground.68
However, a new and unexpected form of identity intermediaries, which did not
fall within the scope of the existing regulatory structure, began to flourish:
intermediaries providing soft elDs.
B. Soft elDs: Definitions, Roles, and Tasks
As the introductory examples demonstrate, a variety of Web 2.0 websites
and applications are now featuring forms of identity issuance, authentication,
and management-or in other words, they are acting as "identity
intermediaries." 69 These intermediation models feature several key technical
differences from the models addressed in the previous section (the hard IDs and
elDs). The central distinction, however, is not technical but economic and
social. As opposed to the staggering models of hard identification addressed in
the eSig Directive, these forms of identity intermediation are extremely popular.
While these new online intermediaries and their models vary, we choose to
characterize them by three central traits: (1) the identification process is
incidental to the relevant firm's overall business plan; (2) the initial and
subsequent identification and verification processes are carried out remotely,
and (3) the firm engaged in elD intermediation is operating in a lightly
regulated setting. Identifying these three traits allows us to refer to such
intermediaries, as a group, as soft elD intermediaries. Every one of these three
elements plays an important role in our discussion of unique policy
recommendations for this specific context. Let us here briefly elaborate on each
one of them.
6 4 Id
6 5 A. Michael Froomkin, Lessons Learned Too Well 9-10 (Sept. 2011) (unpublished
manuscript) (Miami Law Research Paper Series No. 2011-29), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract- 1930017.
66 Or in the words of A. Michael Froomkin: "[D]omesticate deployed technologies and
fit them into known categories." See id at 10; see also Andrew Barofsky, Note, The
European Commission's Directive on Electronic Signatures: Technological "Favoritism"
Towards Digital Signatures, 24 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 145, 14648, 152-57 (2000).
67 Commission Report, supra note 59, 3.3.2.
68 Id
69 Sengupta, supra note 1, at A3.
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1. Incidental
As opposed to the business models envisioned by the drafters of the eSig
Directive, the process of issuing and authenticating soft elDs is incidental to the
overall objectives of the relevant platform or application. The "incidental"
nature of the process could be viewed and derived from several perspectives.
Identification intermediation is incidental to the relevant firm's business plan
and platform. As opposed to the entities envisioned by the eSig Directive
drafters, these intermediaries do not directly generate income by providing an
identification and authentication service for their users to use in other realms.
Soft elDs are generated and managed as means to achieve other objectives; they
strive to promote commerce of various sorts, distribute content or generate
social networks. While these objectives are enabled by identification,
identification is not the central service provided. In addition, the identification
intermediation aspect is incidental in the eyes of the relevant platform's users.
In other words, when users might be asked how they would define Twitter,
Facebook, eBay or Amazon, few would include "identity intermediary" in their
first, second or even third responses. Common responses would probably
include "content provider," "user generated content platform," or "social
network site."
Cautious readers might take issue with the assertions noted above-
especially with the argument that the identification and authentication processes
carried out by social media platforms such as Facebook are merely "incidental"
to their overall strategy. At least in the Facebook context, they will note that the
website's construction of identity is quite fundamental to the platform's
business model and revenue stream. After all, these steps render the website an
ideal platform for carrying out a digital discourse. Furthermore, such steps
enable Facebook's sophisticated behavioral advertising and marketing schemes
which rely upon the personal information that identification schemes provide.
They also generate a substantial source of revenue and value for the firm.
These critiques are well placed. Nonetheless, such new forms of identity
intermediation are quite different from the hard elDs noted above and addressed
by digital signature laws. Even though there are obvious benefits that firms reap
from introducing identification schemes, these are not directly and necessarily
obvious to their users, upon examining the firms' business model. The identity
intermediation abilities are also mostly instrumental by nature-a step on the
way to achieve other goals. Thus, we still find these practices to be "incidental."
This categorization has two important implications for our policy
discussion. One implication relates to a doctrinal argument; the other relates to
the limits of human cognition and consumer protection issues that follow. From
these two perspectives, as we now explain, the incidental nature of the
identification process is clearer and easier to define. From a doctrinal
perspective, according to U.S. law, the fact that identity intermediation is
incidental allows the platforms initiating the process to argue that identity-
related activities are merely subsets of their actions as information providers,
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distributors, and publishers. Taking this position has important legal
implications. It allows intermediaries to convincingly argue that many of their
activities are immune from tort liability (as "publishers") in view of Section 230
of the CDA. 70 Thus, these firms are left, to a great extent, to voluntarily regulate
the identification and verification process, with all the risks that might follow.
Furthermore, from a psychological/consumer protection perspective of law,
the incidental nature of "identification"-at least from the perspective of the
common user who does not understand the centrality of this role to the overall
operation-renders it "non-salient." 71 The concept of "salience" is frequently
noted in the contract and consumer protection related literature.72 As opposed to
central, or salient, features (such as price or time of delivery), non-salient
features of products, services or even contracts (provisions governing choice of
law, jurisdiction, or arbitration) are not fully comprehended and contemplated
by purchasers or users at the time of contract formation. 73 This is a result of the
limitations of human cognition.74 Therefore, with regard to these non-salient
aspects, markets fail to provide outcomes which are sufficiently protective of
users' interests. 75 Courts or regulators might need to step in to assure that the
strategies ultimately adopted by firms are fair and efficient (as opposed to
overly protective of the firms). In other words, when selecting among various
potential websites and their relevant "Terms of Use," users will (at least in
theory) signal their discontent with different aspects of the service and, in that
way, put pressure on the various online firms to meet their tastes and needs.
This might be true for social networks with regard to the number of friends who
are part of the network or other elements related to the user interface. In e-
commerce platforms, this might be true with regard to price and variety of
products. Yet when consumers are faced with non-salient decisions regarding
contractual provisions and technical means governing the intermediation of
identity (such as the intermediaries' liability in instances of impersonation),
they will probably refrain from even considering these aspects and their
possible implications at the time of contract formation. 76 Thus, regulatory
intervention might be called for. We will return to the implication of this
dynamic when considering policy recommendations.
7047 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
71 For a discussion of salience, and the market failures that result from consumer
inattentiveness to non-salient provisions, see Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract
Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form Contracting in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 303, 313, 350 (2008); see also OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY
CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 91-96 (2012).
72 Becher & Zarsky, supra note 71, at 350.
73Id
74 Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1220 (2003).
75 Becher & Zarksy, supra note 71, at 312-13.76 Id. at 315, 350.
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2. Remote Verification
As opposed to the hard identification schemes noted in Part II.A above, the
soft elD identification/validation techniques almost never involve a physical
interaction between the subject and the issuer. While online ventures are
constantly changing and providing new forms of services, 77 they almost always
operate virtually and interact remotely with their users, striving to take full
advantage of the nearly zero marginal costs of additional users in the online
realm. Therefore, these firms are reluctant to set up points of physical
interaction with their users, given their high costs. Yet refraining from a
physical interaction might lead to inherent weaknesses and vulnerability in the
models which might merit regulatory intervention, and generates the concerns
noted below.
3. Lightly Regulated Industries
One of the central premises of this Article is the recognition that a
significant social and economic force-that of the soft elD identity
intermediary-has arisen almost unnoticed and outside the confines and reach
of the existing legal and policy realm. Yet that is not always true. In some
instances, it is possible that soft elD intermediation schemes will be set forth by
entities that are part of a regulated environment. This might be the case if soft
elD initiatives are initiated by banks and financial institutions who are subjected
to some forms of regulation. In a more practical example, soft elD identification
schemes might be set forth by telecommunications carriers (both mobile and
landline-industries that are heavily regulated in Europe and somewhat
regulated in the United States), perhaps in the form of a biometric identification
scheme installed in one's smartphone.78 Our discussion is aimed at the more
difficult questions concerning entities which are currently outside the
regulators' easy reach. In the examples mentioned here, the firms and practices
are not "soft." They are quite often subjected to "hard" law, if needed. For that
reason, including these situations within our current analysis will needlessly
encumber this discussion. However, the lessons derived from our current
analysis of soft elDs can surely be applied to examine identification schemes
implemented by regulated entities.
77 For some more innovative options see Sterritt, supra note 11, at 1727.78 Note, however, that if such initiatives would be set forth by the mobile phone makers
(such as Apple), developers of the operating software (such as Google), or other app
developers, such actions should still be considered as soft elDs, as these are not closely
regulated industries at this juncture.
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III. SOFT EIDS: COMMON VARIATIONS AND KEY EXAMPLES
After defining the realm of soft ellD intermediaries, we must focus on these
intermediaries' unique traits. We here address two additional distinctions to
enable a full understanding of the benefits, troubles, and policy solutions which
we will tackle throughout this Article. We distinguish between ipse and idem
identification schemes. Our current analysis will only refer to the former. In
addition, we introduce two forms of identification schemes which dominate the
soft elD environment: the use of Real Name IDs and Stable Pseudonyms. Every
one of these schemes calls for a discussion of different problems and possible
solutions.
A. The Ipse/Idem Distinction79
First, let us turn to the basic theoretical and philosophical discussion of
identity, identification, and profiling in the digital age. When addressing this
issue, scholars often note two meanings of identity: ipse identity and idem
identity. The first term ("ipse") refers to a digital identity initiated by the
relevant individual.80 The second term ("idem") addresses instances where
others collect and rely upon information they learn about the relevant
individual, over time.81 Clearly, our offline world includes interactions which
are mixed and our identity is constantly being structured by both the subject and
society.
The online realm, however, introduces a somewhat stark practical
distinction among these two theoretical dynamics. In some instances,
individuals carefully work to structure their identity and profile by providing
various forms of data. This occurs on social networking sites where users
carefully attend to their profile, or on e-commerce sites where users strive to
assure a positive reputation. Such a dynamic could be easily referred to as the
construction of an ipse identity and is the core of our discussion in this Article.
At times, in the online realm, profiles are structured exclusively by others,
sometimes even without the relevant individual's actual knowledge. Often this
is carried out through the use of unique tracking identifiers, such as a "persistent
79 Arnold Roosendaal refers to a similar distinction noted by Roger Clarke between the
"projected persona" and the "imposed persona." See ARNOLD ROOSENDAAL, DIGITAL
PERSONAE AND PROFILES IN LAW 8 (2013) (quoting Roger Clarke, The Digital Persona and
Its Application to Data Surveillance, 10 INFO. Soc'Y 77 (1994)).
80 Hildebrandt, supra note 36.
81 These concepts are attributed to Paul Ricoeur, and noted by Hildebrandt, supra note
36; see also Charles D. Raab, Identity: Difference and Categorization, in LESSONS FROM THE
IDENTITY TRAIL, supra note 43, at 227-28 (distinguishing between identity defined by self
and identity defined by others); Mary Rundle et al., At a Crossroads: "Personhood" and
Digital Identity in the Information Society 8 (OECD, STI, Working Paper No. 2007/7, 2008),
available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/31/6/40204773.doc.
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token" 82 installed on the user's device, which allow for tying all the individual's
actions together into an overall mosaic.83 Cookies, for example, allow for the
tracking of online browsing, and for the tailoring of advertisements based on
previous preferences. 84 "Flash cookies" 85 are newer adaptations of this basic
tool. 86 The outcomes of this process could easily be considered as idem
identities.
Idem identities raise a variety of important legal and policy questions,
mostly in the context of information privacy and data protection. Lawmakers
are striving to establish whether and how users should provide consent to the
vast collection of personal information this process involves and how they
might effectively signal they no longer want to participate in this dynamic (an
issue referred to at times as the "Do Not Track" debate). 87 Other issues arising
in this context are assuring users a right and ability to examine the information
collected about them, or request its correction and even deletion.88 In addition,
the use of these dynamics generates concerns of possible discrimination and
potential manipulation. This Article, however, chooses to set all these important
issues aside. It opts for focusing on the ipse identity process-in which
individuals fully embrace their online identities and profiles, and the unique
legal and policy issues that follow.89 Yet one should not worry that the issues
here set aside will be left unattended. These privacy issues are gaining
recognition. The identity aspects, however, are somewhat neglected and
therefore require a focused analysis.
Before continuing, it is important to note that the distinction between these
two forms of identity management is obviously blurry. 90 These two
82 Froomkin, supra note 65, at 18.
83 See James Grimmelmann, First-Class Objects, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
421, 424 (2011) for a discussion of "unique identifiers" and their origin. Grimmelmann
notes that "[u]nique identifiers come from the world of databases, in which one seeks to
store information about the world in a structured manner." Id. He further notes that unique
identifiers are essential for "transforming messes of unstructured information into useful,
structured data about people." Id. at 426.
84 Froomkin, supra note 65, at 18.
85 1d. at 18 n.69.
86 See discussion in Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To Track or "Do Not Track":
Advancing Transparency and Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising, 13
MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 281, 292 (2012).
8 7 FED. TRADE COMM'N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE 4 (2012) [hereinafter FTC REPORT], available at http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326
privacyreport.pdf.; see also Claudia Diaz, Omer Tene & Seda Giirses, Hero or Villain: The
Data Controller in Privacy Law and Technologies, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 923 (2013).
88 See generally Rundle et al., supra note 81, at 33, 35, 50; see also Grimmelmann,
supra note 83, at 430-34 (explaining that unique identifiers allow for automated reasoning,
might empower individuals, yet also lead to negative aspects such as control and
manipulation).
89 Hildebrandt, supra note 36.
90 For a similar point, see ROOSENDAAL, supra note 79, at 41 (noting the existence of
many hybrid forms of identities today).
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intermediation options do not present a dichotomy, but a matter of degree. In
many instances, the models overlap. For example, many e-commerce websites
track their users' behavior in order to present them with tailored advertisements
and recommendations. 9 1 Some users might be unaware of these practices and
are possibly annoyed and even intimidated when they learn of them. Others,
however, might consider these applications as helpful "recommendation
systems," "virtual shoppers," or even "butlers." In some of these cases (such as
on Amazon.com), users are able to attend to structuring their profiles in a way
that resembles the dynamics we will shortly describe. In such cases, some of the
interests and concerns related to "ipse identities" are relevant as well.
Similarly, at times "ipse identity" intermediaries allow for the structuring of
online profiles, yet take the liberty of collecting additional information about
their users, or applying the information provided in ways their users did not
necessarily understand (Facebook's Beacon fiasco is a clear example of this
dynamic). 92 In other words, even in situations where the identity was structured
by the individual, there are coinciding "idem" dynamics unfolding in the
background. Therefore, the existence of an "ipse identity" intermediation
dynamic does not mean that other issues, such as privacy or discrimination,
should not be examined (yet, as mentioned, these matters are beyond the scope
of this Article).
B. Real Names Versus Stable Pseudonyms
1. Real Name IDs
The internet famously promotes anonymous use and speech ("Nobody
knows you're a dog"). 93 However, a growing trend calls for the usage of "real
names" in online interactions. 94 This dynamic is a direct result of a specific
form of soft ellD intermediation. In the following paragraphs we will discuss
Real Name intermediation policies (mandatory vs. voluntary), and verification
methods (ex ante vs. ex post). In addition, we will briefly elaborate upon the
ways in which the use of Real Names alters the online experience.
91 Froomkin, supra note 65, at 18.92 James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REv. 1137, 1147-48 (2009). See
generally Woodrow Hartzog, Social Data, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 995 (2013); Yang Wang et al.,
From Facebook Regrets to Facebook Privacy Nudges, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307 (2013).
93 Peter Steiner, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You're a Dog, NEW YORKER, July 5,
1993, at 61, available at http://www.condenaststore.com/-sp/On-the-Internet-nobody-
knows-you-re-a-dog-New-Yorker-Cartoon-Printsi8562841_.htm.
94Lilian Edwards, From the Fantasy to the Reality: Social Media and Real Name
Policies, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR JON BING (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2262272; Froomkin, supra note 65, at 17-18.
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a. Mandatory Versus Voluntary?
Several dominant identity intermediaries (most famously, Facebook) issue
and authenticate the users' online identity while contractually stipulating they
will only do so if the identity managed is identical to the one the user applies in
the physical world. 95 At times the intermediary moves to assure compliance
with this request by sanctioning the relevant identity, changing its name, and
even removing it from the platform if a breach in this policy is proven. 96
The Real Names strategy of identity intermediation is not unique to the soft
elD context. Quite to the contrary, up until recently, this model was considered
the norm. Real names and IDs are used in personal communications, or in a
commercial transaction which requires authentication for payment.97 Banks,
smart cards, and credit cards, not to mention national IDs and passports, all
make use of Real Name IDs when issuing and validating means of
identification.98 Yet the online realm has introduced users to anonymous and
pseudonymous identification. The fact that the internet offers other forms of
identification which users might have grown accustomed to renders a shift to a
mandatory Real Names policy a point of contention. 99
Other intermediaries (such as Google+ or Amazon) are less aggressive and
permit their users to make use of either Real Names or a pseudonym of their
choice (a strategy we address below). 00 Here, when opting to use a Real Name,
some services offer the option of signaling that their name was verified (an
option made available, for example, by Amazon and Twitter).' 0 ' It is
noteworthy that the option of straying from the use of Real Names is not limited
to soft elDs or the online realm. For instance, some credit card companies allow
for the issuing of a prepaid anonymous card.102
95 Edwards, supra note 94; Froomkin, supra note 65, at 17-18. Froomkin specifically
refers to Facebook's policy "against pseudonyms." Id. at 17. Facebook indeed notes that an
individual may not use more than one ID. See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities,
supra note 41, § 4.
96 For a discussion of a patent issued to Google for the identification of fraudulent
names, see Douglas Perry, Google Gets Social Network Impersonation Detection Patent,
TOM'S GUIDE (July 19, 2012, 6:30 AM), http://www.tomsguide.com/us/google-patent-
social-network-hack-fraud,news-1 5927.html.
97 Davis, supra note 43.
98 Id.
99 Edwards, supra note 94 (manuscript at 9); danah boyd, "Real Names " Policies Are
an Abuse of Power, APOPHENIA (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/ar
chives/2011/08/04/real-names.html.
100 Another example of a firm which recently allowed the use of pseudonyms is
FourSquare. See Greg Norcie, Foursquare Updates TOS To Allow Pseudonyms,
NORCIE.COM (Jan. 30, 2013), http://norcie.com/2013/01/30/4sqwin/.
101 Sengupta, supra note 1, at A3 (mentioning that Rushdie uses a Twitter verified
account).
102 Gift Cards & Prepaid Cards, AM. ExPREss, https://www.americanexpress.com/us/
content/merchant/get-support/prepaid-cards.html (last visited July 16, 2013).
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The shift to a mandatory Real Name identification model in the online
realm has generated dispute and discussion. The issue was aptly dubbed the
"Nymwars."l 03 One of the central points of tension came to light upon the
introduction of Google's social network-Google+. Initially, Google+ required
the registration of real names (thus opting for a mandatory Real Names
regime). 104 After a flurry of criticism, Google eventually conceded this
requirement and allowed the use of pseudonyms. 0 5 Facebook's mandatory Real
Name identification has also been criticized. In Germany, for instance, this
issue went beyond the public protest and social debate, eventually reaching the
courts. 106 News reports indicate that the Data Protection Agency of the German
state of Schleswig-Holstein sued Facebook for its prohibition of using
pseudonyms, a right arguably provided by German law. 107 The case was
eventually thrown out on jurisdictional grounds (as Facebook's European
offices are in Ireland and thus subject to Irish, not German law).'08 Indeed, the
German sensitivity toward this issue is reflected in an option enabled by
German legislation (and technology) to register a pen name into a person's ID
card in addition to his or her civil name. 109 This card allows German nationals
to interact with various entities without revealing their "real name" (something
Facebook users are currently unable to do).I10
b. Verification Methods
The verification of the Real Name is carried out through the use of various
strategies. Broadly, we note ex ante and ex post approaches. Some
intermediaries require identification before using the Real Name. This mostly
occurs when the Real Name is voluntary, and the user opts for its use
specifically. At that point, a verifying badge is provided by the intermediary.
Here we must again remember that these online ventures operate remotely and
l0 3 boyd, supra note 99.104 Eva Galperin, 2011 in Review: Nymwars, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 26,
2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/12/2011 -review-nymwars.
105 Id.
106Nick Clayton, Facebook Pseudonym Ban Breaks German Law, WALL. ST. J. TECH
BLOG (Dec. 19, 2012, 7:12 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/tech-europe/2012/12/19/facebook-
pseudonym-ban-breaks-german-law/.
107 Id.
108See Edwards, supra note 94; Natasha Lomas, Facebook Wins Court Challenge in
Germany Against Its Real Names Policy, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 15, 2013), http://tech
crunch.com/2013/02/1 5/facebook-wins-court-challenge-in-germany-against- its-real-names-
policy/.
109 Gesetz tiber Personalausweise und den elektronischen Identitaitsnachweis sowie zur
Anderung weiterer Vorschriften [PAuswG] [Act on Identity Cards and Electronic
Identification], June 18, 2009, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I BGBL. I at 1348-50, § 5, no. 2,
§ 9, no. 3 (Ger.), quoted in GERRIT HORNUNG & JAN MOLLER, PASSGESETZ
PERSONALAUSWEISGESETZ 188-89,207-08 (2011).
' 
10 Id.
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need to overcome the challenges of scale and distance. One possible option,
used for instance by Amazon, compares the name selected to the one appearing
on the user's credit card previously used through the Amazon system. Here, in
fact, the identity intermediary is relying on the original identification and
authentication process carried out by the credit card company (which, in turn,
greatly relies on authentication processes carried out by banks and credit
agencies). In other instances, firms merely verify identity ex post-after a
complaint was posted"' or other indications of a possible breach of the "Real
Names" policy. In these cases, firms tend to engage in a more aggressive
inspection, such as requiring that copies of official state-issued papers
indicating the name of the relevant user are sent to the intermediary.11 2 Other
sites engage in far more imaginative ways to verify user identity, such as
presenting users with quizzes about their own (claimed) personal lives based on
information found in public records.113
c. Real Name elDs: Unique Benefits and Uses
The introduction of Real Name policies has impacted the online realm in
several ways. First, the use of Real Names allows for an ongoing flow of
reputational information from the online to the offline world; actions of an
individual offline will be attributed to the online persona (and vice versa).114
The use of Real Names enables speakers to easily capitalize on their offline
social capital in an online world (and vice versa).1 5 It instantly and simply
allows individuals to move their offline social circles online.' 16 Yet it also
allows reputational harms to flow from the online realm to the offline one (and
vice versa).117 This flow of reputational information has a direct impact on the
overall social discourse online. If mandated or broadly accepted, the use of Real
Names can assure that online participants conduct themselves in a respectable
manner, while understanding that the social (and, at times, legal) sanctions
against unruly conduct in the online realm will follow in the offline realm as
well, where they can impact one's actual life and liberty." 8 Yet this dynamic
I" 'Facebook presents a button for reporting possible breaches of the Real Name policy.
112As occurred with Salman Rushdie in this Article's opening example. See Sengupta,
supra note 1, at A3.
113 See Sterritt, supra note 11, at 1726-27.
114See discussion in Tal Z. Zarsky, Information Privacy in Virtual Worlds: Identifying
Unique Concerns Beyond the Online and Offline Worlds, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 231, 243
(2004). For a discussion and definition of the important role of reputation in the internet
economy, see Eric Goldman, The Regulation of Reputational Information, in THE NEXT
DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 293, 295-96 (Berin Szoka &
Adam Marcus eds., 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1754628.
1 15 See Zarsky, supra note 114, at 243.
116jd
117 Id
118 Interesting empirical work regarding this specific issue was made possible in South
Korea, where a law (which was already repealed) generated a form of "Real Name Policy."
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might also inhibit individuals from conducting themselves freely online and
enjoying the social benefits such behavior might entail.
Furthermore, the use of Real Names generates another important dynamic
when it meets the realm of social networks-it allows online users to signal and
indicate the structure of real world/offline social graphs and their position
within them. In doing so, individuals are able to signal their social stature (given
the number of people they know, the actual people they know, or their centrality
in a social network), or even enable others to authenticate their identity by
indicating who can vouch for them.1 19 This function is an important feature for
websites such as Linkedln, which are used for networking, job seeking, and
recruiting.120
With the growing and successful use of Real Name policies, Facebook and
other identity intermediaries have emerged as tools for identification and even
authentication.121 Consider the now-popular phrase, "Check out my Facebook
page." In this statement, users encourage others to take the authenticated
information available in the online realm, and apply it to other contexts (both
online and offline). In fact, authentication via Facebook's identification system
is a growing trend which is migrating to other models and websites. A broad
variety of applications, such as online games, virtual worlds, 122 and other
See Daegon Cho & Soodong Kim, Empirical Analysis of Online Anonymity and User
Behaviors: The Impact of Real Name Policy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 45TH HAWAII
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SYSTEM SCIENCES 3041, 3042-43, 3046 (2012), available
at http://origin-www.computer.org/csdl/proceedings/hicss/2012/4525/00/06149194.pdf.
Note that here users were only required to provide their names to the government and not to
other users. Id. Researchers found decreases of some forms of antisocial behavior. Id.
119 See discussion in John Brainard et al., Fourth-Factor Authentication: Somebody You
Know, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND
COMMUNICATIONs SECURITY 168, 168-69 (2006), available at http://www.rsasecurity.cal
rsalabs/staff/bios/ajuels/publications/fourth-factor/ccsO84-juels.pdf ("User authentication in
computing systems traditionally depends on three factors: something you have (e.g., a
hardware token), something you are (e.g., a fingerprint), and something you know (e.g., a
password) . . . [T]his paper . .. explore[s] a fourth factor, the social network of the user, that
is, somebody you know.").
120 The existence of a social context or even a social graph alters a popular limitation of
a "real name" identification scheme-that in many cases the mere usage of a Real Name
cannot lead to an identification of a "real person," especially if the name is a popular one.
Yet with the social graph and context, one has additional tools which will assist in verifying
that the specific "John Doe" he is interacting with is the one he had in mind (the plumber
from Berlin and not the singer from Paris, for instance).
121 See Sengupta, supra note 1, at A3 ("Facebook insists on what it calls authentic
identity, or real names. And it is becoming a de facto passport vendor of sorts, allowing its
users to sign into seven million other sites and applications with their Facebook user names
and passwords.").
122 For a discussion, see Eva Galperin, New Blizzard Forum Policy Will Require Posters
To Use Real Names, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (July 8, 2010), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2010/07/new-blizzard-forum-policy-will-require-posters-use.
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websites123 allow individuals to identify themselves using their Facebook
username and password.124 This dynamic indicates that problems with soft
identity intermediation in one context (errors and all) spill over to other realms
which rely upon the original identity intermediation process. This point
illustrates the significance of the identity intermediation process, and perhaps, at
times, the need for regulatory intervention.
In addition, the shift toward Real Names policies (especially if they are
mandatory) generates vast benefits to the intermediaries themselves.1 25 They are
now vested with a rich corpus of knowledge-personal information pertaining
to their users. 126 In addition, they also may track social ties and therefore gain
insights into structures of power and measures of influence throughout
society.127 Recent reports have indicated the use of such knowledge in the 2012
presidential campaign,128 following success in the commercial realm. At times,
these insights might even be used to the users' detriment. Therefore,
intermediaries might be "over-motivated" to shift users to a Real Names
regime. If this model generates problems to users and society in general, the law
might be required to somewhat chill such motivation. 129
123 The number of websites and platforms making use of the Facebook identification
scheme is growing at a quick pace. Skype, Spotify, Netflix, Washington Post, and LinkedIn
are only a few examples of the long list of these websites and platforms. See also Integrating
Facebook in iOS, PARSE, https://parse.com/tutorials/integrating-facebook-in-ios (last visited
July 16, 2013); Nick Margerrison, UK Government To Use Facebook in "New" National ID
Scheme, DISINFORMATION (Oct. 5, 2012), http://disinfo.com/2012/10/uk-government-to-use-
facebook-in-new-national-id-scheme/.
124 For more on this dynamic see Simson Garfinkel, Facebook Wants To Supply Your
Internet Driver's License, MIT TECH. REv. (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.technologyreview.
com/news/422285/facebook-wants-to-supply-your-internet-drivers-license/; see also Omer
Tene, Me, Myselfand 1, 8 J. INT'L COM. L. & TECH. 118, 119 (2013).
125 See Edwards, supra note 94, at 7-9.
126jd.
127 Id.
128 See Charles Duhigg, Campaigns Mine Personal Lives To Get Out Vote, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 14, 2012, at Al, A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/14/us/politics/cam
paigns-mine-personal-lives-to-get-out-vote.html?pagewanted=1&hp.
129 Note that at times the law itself might be encouraging a shift toward an identification
scheme which calls for strictly gathering information about the users' real identity. For
instance, according to a news report, a recent U.K. defamation law encourages user-
generated content websites to gather information which enables victims to directly sue
tortfeasors. Eric Goldman, UK's New Defamation Law May Accelerate the Death of
Anonymous User Generated Content, FORBES (May 9, 2013, 3:05 PM), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/05/09/uks-new-defamation-law-may-accelerate-the-death-of-
anonymous-user-generated-content-internationally/. When doing so, the websites will
qualify for the law's protection from the victims' claims. See id
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2. Stable Pseudonyms
Not all soft elD intermediaries or users make use of Real Names. As noted,
some intermediaries allow users to assume an online identity, and interact while
using a pseudonym, nickname, or "handle." For instance, in addition to using
their Real Names, Amazon also allows users to make use of a "Pen Name." 30
This Pen Name could be used at all junctures throughout the Amazon
website.131 If the user chooses to change it, all references to such a name will
change accordingly.132 It is, in other words, a stable pseudonym linked to a
specific user. Google's social networking site Google+ allows users, with some
restrictions,1 33 to identify themselves using pseudonyms and handles when
interacting throughout the network. Here, the role of the identity intermediary is
still important and substantial. It must assure that only the relevant and
authenticated users have access to their handles. In these cases (assuming the
relevant individual does not expose identifying information) there is no flow
between the physical and online persona; whatever happens online, stays
online. 134
The benefits and concerns of this model are the mirror image of those
discussed in the context of Real Names. It allows individuals to exercise
pseudonymous speech and conduct, with all the possible advantages it entails. It
also might generate some of the concerns related to uninhibited speech online. It
allows for the structuring of elaborate social graphs, yet these are limited to
online personas and therefore far less illuminating, especially for those viewing
them externally.135
130 Help: About Pen Names, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/dis
play.html?ie=UTF8&nodeld=201145360 (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
131 Id.
132 Help: Edit Your Pen Name, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/dis
play.html?ie=UTF8&nodeld=14279641 (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
133 Violet Blue, Google's Pseudonym Problem: New Implementation Revealed, ZDNET
(Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/violetblue/googles-pseudonym-problem-new-im
plementation-revealed/992.
134 One might note that the mere option of Real Names-even if they are voluntary-
will lead to a dynamic that eventually shifts the entire discourse to Real Names. This will
result from an "unraveling effect" in which trusted users will shift to the use of Real Names
given the fact that they have "nothing to hide." Thereafter, those using pseudonyms will be
treated with suspicion, pressuring these pseudonymous users to shift to Real Names as well,
and so on. For more on this "unraveling effect" in a somewhat different context, see Scott R.
Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus & the Threat of a Full Disclosure
Future, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 1153, 1176-90 (2011). It is unclear whether this dynamic will
indeed transpire in this context, and for that reason this issue is not addressed further in this
Article.
135 It is possible that firms controlling the social graph are able to establish the users'
identity or other personal traits from their location within the social graph. This important
point is beyond our current discussion.
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In addition, the growing importance of individuals' actions in the online
realm now generates novel forms of identity interests-interests solely relating
to the online identity. Maintaining trust and reputation within the online realm is
an important objective on its own. 136 It may have substantial emotional and
even monetary implications for avid online users. For instance, in virtual
marketplaces, such as eBay, the individual's livelihood might depend on
maintaining a sound online persona.137 A tarnished identity will lead to a slide
in sales and even abolishment from the marketplace. Returning to the market
with a new identity will hardly prove helpful. Newcomers with clean histories
are treated with suspicion.138 Beyond the business realm and in other contexts,
the implications are personal and social. For instance, in the context of
multiplayer online games or other realms of ongoing social interaction,
tarnishing the online identity could inflict severe grief upon the relevant
individual. These are realms in which the individual spends many hours of
human interaction, invests social capital and in some instances forms strong ties
with other participants. These are all jeopardized when the integrity of the
individual's virtual identity is compromised.1 39
Upon concluding this part, we note that intermediaries enabling the use of
stable pseudonyms collect vast amounts of personal information as well. While
this intermediation model does not call for sharing the users' Real Name with
others, these intermediaries might be collecting information connecting the
online persona to the pseudonym of choice directly from its users through
various factors which are accessible to them.140 They might also be privy to the
social graph formulating among their users. However, the knowledge
intermediaries accumulate here will not be as insightful as that made available
136 See discussion in Zarsky, supra note 114, at 251.
137 Daniel H. Kahn, Social Intermediaries: Creating a More Responsible Web Through
Portable Identity, Cross-web Reputation, and Code-Backed Norms, 11 COLUM. Sci. & TECH.
L. REv. 176, 186 (2010).
138 Paul Resnick et al., The Value of Reputation on eBay: A Controlled Experiment, 9
EXPERIMENTAL EcoN. 79, 97-98 (2006), available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.100
7%2Fsl0683-006-4309-2 (arguing that a public profile, even one that includes negative
feedbacks, is preferable to a blank profile).
139 F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CALIF. L.
REv. 1, 6, 63, 67 (2004). Note, however, that policy decisions recognizing the value and
importance of the virtual persona should perhaps also reflect society's attitudes towards the
extensive usage of such online realms. If over-usage of these online realms is considered
wasteful, perhaps the recognition of such virtual reputation should be limited. It also should
be noted that, at times, the virtual reputation might "bleed" into the real name behind the
pseudonym. Therefore, the importance of these virtual personas might be even greater. For a
discussion of this dynamic in a somewhat different context, see Jennifer E. Rothman, The
Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185, 217 (2012) ("People have multiple
identities (both public and private) that they perform. These different identities are not
separable from one another; instead, the boundaries are fluid and flow in and out of one
another." (footnote omitted)).
140 Such as IP addresses, credit card information, email addresses, and mandatory or
voluntary registration.
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with Real Name intermediations. With pseudonymity available, networks might
overlap, as individuals might appear several times in various networks, while
using different names.
IV. THE BENEFITS AND PITFALLS OF SOFT EID INTERMEDIATION
To establish the proper regulatory scheme for identity intermediation, we
must understand whether such regulation or legal intervention might promote an
important social purpose.141 For that, we must recognize the benefits of
competent intermediation, and the detriments of negligently (or purposefully)
failing to carry out this role. We begin with a very brief normative overview of
possible benefits, and thereafter map out how they could be compromised,
drawing from both the theoretical analysis carried out above and actual
instances which occurred in previous years, as noted by both the courts and the
press.
A. The Benefits of Soft elDs: Economic, Personal, and Social
The benefitsl 42 of soft elD intermediaries and intermediation emerge on
several dimensions. The first benefit is economic-related to the enablement of
transactions and commerce in a trusted environment. While digital anonymity
generates vast benefits, it might inhibit commerce given the lack of information
regarding the parties involved. For instance, in the context of buyer to customer
(B2C) transactions, vendors might suffer from their inability to know their
(anonymous) customers well enough online. In such a case both transacting
parties are subject to high search costs while seeking out an optimal transaction.
With stable identities, vendors are able to tailor offers and advertisements on the
basis of identity traits, and provide consumers with what they are most likely to
purchase (note of course that this final assertion is easily subjected to powerful
critiques). 143
Identity intermediation is far more important in the customer to customer
(C2C) context. Virtual marketplaces, such as eBay, rely upon stable identities
for both buyers and sellers so as to generate trust. 144 C2C markets do not enable
141 For a somewhat different mapping of the benefits and concerns of electronic
identities, as set forth by the British Government, see CABINET OFFICE, PRIVACY AND
CONSUMER ADVISORY GROUP: DRAFT IDENTITY ASSURANCE PRINCIPLES (2013) (U.K.),
available at https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/draft-identity-assurance-princi
ples/privacy-and-consumer-advisory-group-draft-identity-assurance-principles.
142 Perhaps the most basic and intuitive benefit of these tools is that they generate
personal enjoyment and wellbeing. This is evident from the massive and extensive
participation in these social networks. The analysis, however, must go beyond this point and
examine whether additional benefits arise.
143 Tailored advertising and marketing might upset consumers or lead to biased
outcomes. It might also allow marketers to discriminate and manipulate the public.
144 See also discussion as to how eBay and other websites use various measures to
capture "word of mouth." Reputation systems play an important role in achieving this
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the collection of and reliance upon physical cues which provide information
regarding the nature and trustworthiness of both sellers and buyers-
information societies have relied upon for centuries. Functioning identity
intermediaries promote efficiency in these markets by enabling the creation of
trust on the basis of previous transactions-all linked to a constant online
identity. Thus, these intermediaries, at least in theory and in this context,
enhance efficiency and promote commerce. 145
Identity intermediation might hold many benefits with regard to other
important aspects, such as the protection of personality (identity) interests, 146
the development of individual autonomy, or advancing human rights.147 Identity
is inextricably linked to our personality, embodying both an interest and right,
collectively categorized as personality rights. The latter are "private law
(subjective) rights which are by nature non-patrimonial and highly personal in
objective. Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and Its Implications for Trademark Law, in
TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 404, 411-12
(Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-
1020695.
145 The text does not specifically address a salient form of identity intermediaries: dating
websites. Indeed these websites might be in a category of their own. On the one hand, they
promote social interactions which have important benefits (that are somewhat different than
those addressed in the text). In addition, misrepresentations carried out within them can
seriously hamper individuals' wellbeing. On the other hand, they are commercial ventures
and therefore protecting the nature of the identities promotes the business objectives of the
website operators. For these reasons, they might require a separate analysis and discussion.
For some additional sources regarding this specific matter, see Susan Haigh, States Seek To
Make Online Dating Safer with New Laws, HUFFINGTON POsT (Apr. 21, 2011, 7:25 AM ET),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/21/online-dating-laws n 851946.html; Anita
Ramasastry, Legislating Love Online: Should States Mandate that Online Dating Sites Do
Criminal Background Checks of Their Users?, FINDLAW (Sept. 28, 2006), http://writ.news.
findlaw.com/ramasastry/20060928.html. For a recent law passed in New Jersey regarding
such sites, see Internet Dating Safety Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1, 168 (West 2012).146 Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REv. 445, 445-46 (1915); see
also J. NEETHLING ET AL., NEETHLING'S LAW OF PERSONALITY 39 (1996) ("Identity as an
interest of personality can be defined as a person's uniqueness or individuality which
identifies or individualises him as a particular person and thus distinguishes him from others.
Identity is manifested in various indicia by which that particular person can be recognised; in
other words, facets of his personality which are characteristic of or unique to him, such as
his life history, his character, his name, his creditworthiness, his voice, his handwriting, his
appearance (physical image), etcetera. A person has a definite interest in the uniqueness of
his being and conduct being respected by outsiders." (citations omitted)).
147 For the argument in favor of an explicit and specific right to identity and the debate
on the need and desirability of considering it (or upgrading it to) a human right, see Norberto
Nuno Gomes de Andrade & Paul De Hert, Proposing a Right to Identity Within the
International Framework of Human Rights: Issues and Prospects, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES
AND HuMAN RIGHTS 231, 231 (Mario Viola de Azevedo Cunha et al. eds., 2013); see also
Paul Bemal, The Right to Online Identity 2 (Sept. 7, 2012) (unpublished manuscript)
(University of East Anglia (UEA), Norwich Law School, Working Paper), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-2143138 (referring to documents written by the United Nations and
the ECHR).
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the sense that they cannot exist independently of a person since they are
inseparably bound up with his personality." 48 Under the broader notion of
personality rights, many European countries established a right to personal
identity in their legal systems. 149 It is precisely the idea of the uniqueness and
singularity of the human being that has conferred to the right to personal
identity its own conceptual autonomy within the group of personality rights to
which it belongs. Apart from control over the several indicia of one's
identity,o50 the right to identity presupposes a "definite interest in the
uniqueness of his being."' 5 '
Well-functioning identity intermediaries of the forms noted above are
crucial for protecting individuals' personality interests, namely their specific
identity interests. Faulty identity intermediation systems may exacerbate the
ways through which a person's identity can be distorted, deleted, stolen,
misappropriated, impersonated, falsified, and misrepresented, rendering it
increasingly vulnerable. 152 In sum, this right cannot be exercised when the
intermediaries' activities are compromised.
In the internet context and beyond, scholars have noted the importance of
providing individuals with the opportunity to develop their identities, preferably
using different identities for different audiences and social contexts (and indeed
this aspect might be compromised when Real Names are mandated)., 5 3 Identity
"development" can be understood as the ability to "create" and "assert"l 54 or
"construct[]" and "manage[]" 55 the online profile. Others explain how these
virtual identities could be used for articulation and exploration and thus enhance
148 Johann Neethling, Personality Rights: A Comparative Overview, 38 COMP. & INT'L
L.J. S. AFR. 210, 223 (2005).
14 9 In fact, the right to identity has been recognized eo nomine in countries such as Italy,
France, Switzerland, South Africa, and Portugal. Id. at 235. Regarding the latter, the right to
personal identity is explicitly enshrined in PORT. CONST. art. 26, § 1:
Everyone shall possess the right to a personal identity, to the development of their
personality, to civil capacity, to citizenship, to a good name and reputation, to their
likeness, to speak out, to protect the privacy of their personal and family life, and to
legal protection against any form of discrimination.
50 William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and Identity in Social Marketing,
2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 1105, 1132 (addressing the importance of identity control, which he
sees as an extension of the self, and noting that this interest could even be derived from the
seminal privacy article by Warren and Brandeis); see also Mark P. McKenna, The Right of
Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. Prrr. L. REv. 225, 282 (2005).
151 NEETHLING ET AL., supra note 146.
152 In addition, the need to ensure the proper functioning of identity intermediaries is
also related to what Oreg has defined as a "right to information identity." See Oreg, supra
note 19, at 2 ("the right of an individual to the functionality of the information platforms that
enable others to identify and know him and to remember who and what he is").
153 ROOSENDAAL, supra note 79, at 46 (referring to the ability to engage in
"representation," and drawing on the work of Erving Goffman).
154 See Bernal, supra note 147.
155 Grimmelmann, supra note 92, at 1152-53.
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autonomy.156 Again these are all objectives that a well-functioning identity
intermediary can forward.
In addition, and beyond individual rights, identity intermediaries can play
an important role in promoting a rich social discourse, which in turn can
advance democracy and speech-related interests. Soft elDs have proven
constructive in creating and maintaining social ties of various strengths (given
the ability to signal social stature and other important attributes). Furthermore,
they provide a powerful platform for creating and diffusing ideas and
expressions. With these social ties in place and given the digital technology
available, the internet already provides for easy, cheap, and sophisticated ways
to communicate. Yet identity intermediaries allow for the enhancement of such
communications, given the ability to interact with others while understanding
what they did and said in the past, acknowledging their social graph and
recognizing they will maintain a stable online persona.
Yet before proceeding it is important to note that extensive usage of soft
elDs, especially as Stable Pseudonyms (rather than Real Names), might prove
harmful to weaker segments of society-such as minorities and women. When
no one is held accountable and social norms of civility cannot be enforced, the
ugly face of society surfaces. The contribution of pseudonymous social
networks (which are enabled by elDs) to such attacks unfolds on two levels:
either by abusing minorities and women within the social network, or by
planning harmful activities against individuals outside the social network.157
Both outcomes are enabled by an intermediation system which allows for
maintaining an inner circle of trust and acquaintance on the inside, and a mask
of anonymity on the outside. For that reason, we must be cautious of excessive
efforts to enable and even immunize these forms of identity intermediation.
B. Identity-Related Harms and Soft Identity Intermediaries
After broadly noting the interests identity intermediaries promote, we can
now move to address harms which arise when the intermediation process is
interrupted or "attacked." For our discussion of this matter, and its relation to
the process of soft elD intermediation, we chose to focus on two groups of
concerns: those generated by third parties, and those directly resulting from the
problematic actions of the intermediary. 158
Beyond these issues (and the discussion of the Article) is the common
concern often noted in this context-that of information privacy and security.
These relate to questions as to how the information could be used by the
15 6 See generally SHERRY TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN: IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF THE
INTERNET 177-255 (1995).
157 Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REv. 61, 64, 75 (2009).
158 Bemal, supra note 147, at 13 (offering the following three categories of online
identity interests which require protection: (1) protecting harm to that identity, (2) protection
from impersonation, (3) protecting links between online and offline identity). We address all
of these elements and more in the analysis below.
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platform operator and shared with third parties. In addition, they address how
information must be stored, when it should be passed on to government, and
when it should be deleted. The privacy related issues are broad and complex. In
some contexts, the privacy-based analysis will overlap with the issues discussed
here. Indeed, similar broad interests-such as promoting autonomy, expression,
and democracy-are shared by both privacy and the property/identity/dignity
interests we now address. Yet this Article sets these privacy-related matters
aside, and turns to interests which were not necessarily integrated into existing
privacy law and even theory-the identity rights of virtual and pseudonymous
identities.
1. Identity, "Virtual Identity" Theft and Fraud, and the Possible Role
and Responsibility of the Intermediary
An intuitive concern which arises when dealing with systems that generate
identities and strive to create trust is that the identities' integrity might be
compromised (a practice recently dubbed as "e-personation"). 159 Over time, and
as these failures become public, the intermediation process's trust will be
undermined. Without trust, none of the economic, personal, and social benefits
noted above will follow, and the rights noted above will not be protected. In
addition and as explained below, these concerns generate various harms to the
relevant parties involved.
Several variations of these concerns come to mind. Let us consider
situations in which (1) a soft elD is hijacked; (2) a soft elD is formulated so as
to impersonate another; (3) a virtual identity engages in identity
misrepresentation vis-d-vis its physical identity.160 We briefly explain these
three concerns and how such attacks might unfold. We also explain how the
intermediaries' conduct indirectly impacts the likelihood of these events. In
doing so, we will distinguish between Real Name identities and those that are
merely Stable Pseudonyms. Throughout our discussion, we also briefly discuss
the current role of law in battling or enabling these dynamics.
159See, e.g., Anita Ramasastry, Does Match.com Have To Make Sure Its Member
Profiles Are Real and Accurate?: Why a Federal Judge Correctly Ruled No, VERDICT (Sept.
11, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/09/1 l/does-match-com-have-to-make-sure-its-mem
ber-profiles-are-real-and-accurate.
160 While the concerns noted and the distinctions among them are of greatest relevance
in the online realm, they are reflected, at times, in the offline realm. For instance, note
Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009). In this case, the Supreme Court
examines whether an individual using counterfeit identification papers needs to "know" that
the social security numbers included are merely false, or belong to someone else in order to
be found guilty of "aggravated identity theft" (and thus receive an extended sentence). Id. at
647. In other words, the Court examines some aspects of the distinction between
impersonation and identity misrepresentation. We thank James Grimmelmann for making
this point.
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Before proceeding, a short general note as to the current role of the law
regarding these matters and the role of intermediaries: At present, the relevant
intermediaries try to "lawyer away" the implications arising from the problems
mentioned. Amazon, for instance, confronts the risk that these problems will
harm their users and subject Amazon itself to liability claims by acknowledging
these issues in its terms of use. Amazon specifically stipulates that it is a
"passive conduit" and that it "cannot and do[es] not warrant, verify or guarantee
the quality accuracy or integrity of information" the users may access. 161 Thus,
according to such contractual language, the individual's reliance on the
intermediary's authentication systems should be limited and the intermediary
should not carry any liability. Yet the existence of contractual provisions should
not "close the book" on these discussions. Courts might find that these
provisions, as being part of a contract of adhesion, should not be upheld. In
addition, courts might allow third parties to bring action against the
intermediary given their reliance on the identification and authentication
process (and limit the immunity provided through tort law via Section 230 of
the CDA). Therefore, the following policy analysis is crucial for responding to
these and other open and unfolding legal questions.
The first variation of these forms of identity concerns involves the hacking
and hijacking of an elD. Here, an adversary accesses the user's account and
assumes his or her identity, via the relevant intermediary. The "hacker" can then
move to tarnish the user's reputation, or to carry out other attacks undetected.
The hacker might abuse this situation so as to also attack third parties who trust
the original user (yet not the attacker). The reputational damage caused to the
victim is severe. It goes beyond negative content stated about him or her in the
online realm. The damage is exacerbated due to the fact that the negative
statements are actually attributed to the specific individual. In addition, the
victim in many instances is harmed by the sense of self violation and loss of
control over an identity, which comes with this form of attack.162 Finally, given
the possible impersonation such a hack enables, financial losses might of course
161 See Profile and Community Guidelines, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/
help/customer/display.html?ie=UTF8&nodeld=14279631 (last visited July 20, 2013);
Facebook notes this point, while generally stating that:
WE TRY TO KEEP FACEBOOK UP, BUG-FREE, AND SAFE, BUT YOU USE IT
AT YOUR OWN RISK. WE ARE PROVIDING FACEBOOK AS IS WITHOUT ANY
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES INCLUDING . . . WE DO NOT
GUARANTEE THAT FACEBOOK WILL ALWAYS BE SAFE, SECURE OR
ERROR-FREE . .. FACEBOOK IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTIONS,
CONTENT, INFORMATION, OR DATA OF THIRD PARTIES, AND YOU
RELEASE US, OUR DIRECTORS, OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, AND AGENTS
FROM ANY CLAIMS AND DAMAGES, KNOWN AND UNKNOWN, ARISING
OUT OF OR IN ANY WAY CONNECTED WITH ANY CLAIM YOU HAVE
AGAINST ANY SUCH THIRD PARTIES.
Statement ofRights and Responsibilities, supra note 41, § 16(3).
162 See Smith, supra note 11.
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follow. Damages can go beyond the victims of the hijacking and include third
parties that relied on actions and statements made during the impersonation
process. These third parties might have trusted the original identity holder and
taken action based upon the instructions, insights, or advice of a hacker. Their
reliance upon a mistaken identity might have caused them monetary or other
losses, possibly due to the negligence of the identity intermediary.
Identity hijacking cases are already reaching the courts. This was the case
with In re Rolando, which involved a new addition to the California Penal
Code-Section 528.5.163 Rolando used a password he received (without his
actual solicitation) to access the victim's Facebook account and altered it "in a
vulgar manner."1 64 Rolando was found criminally liable.165 Similar cases and
new laws have been introduced in other states as well to address these instances.
The actions noted might also constitute an "unauthorized access" to the victim's
account. In these cases, such actions will be considered a breach of anti-hacking
laws (most notably, the CFAA).1 66 Yet the complex legal question as to whether
these lawsl 67 will apply has led to the specific criminal laws mentioned. Finally,
the acts of hacking and unauthorized usage are clearly contrary to the relevant
elD intermediary's terms of use or service168 (although the actor might not be in
privity with the relevant intermediary given the fact that the account is being
hacked, and therefore the discussion of contractual remedies might not be of
relevance).
As this example and others demonstrate, attackers could try to obtain the
subject's password through social engineering or other illicit measures. They
could also try to attack the relevant website's security directly. Or, they might
have received access from a third party.169 In some of these cases, the
intermediary's architecture and vigilance (for instance the level of security
measures that a relevant intermediary uses) can clearly impact the extent of this
form of risk and the damages that follow. Therefore, the intermediary should
perhaps be considered responsible, even liable, for these actions and their
consequences.
A final interesting point concerns the Real Name/Stable Pseudonym
distinction. The issue at hand is usually associated with the abuse of Real Name
163 CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5 (West 2013) (also allowing for filing a civil action,
claiming punitive damages and attorney's fees).
164In re Rolando S., 197 Cal. App. 4th 936, 939 (2011).
165Id.; see also Owen J. Sloane & Rachel M. Stilwell, Online Impersonation,
GLADSTONE MICHEL, ALC, http://www.gladstonemichel.com/onlineimpersonation.shtml
(last visited July 17, 2013).
166 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(ii) (2006). The issue of applying the CFAA to these
situations is beyond the confines of this Article.
167 See infra note 201 and accompanying text.168 Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 41, § 3(5) ("You will not ...
access an account belonging to someone else.").169 Very difficult questions arise when the victims themselves were the ones providing
access information to the "hacker" who moved on to betray their trust. We will not address
this thorny matter (which might arise when couples break up) in this Article.
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systems (as in the Rolando example noted above). With Real Name identities at
stake, a breach of the virtual identity can lead to serious "real world"
implications: severe financial losses in all aspects of life, considerable
reputational harms, and a strong visceral sense of the violation of a personal
space. In addition, damages to third parties are foreseeable in this case as
individuals might wrongfully rely upon an offline identity they already know.
Yet it is also possible that these harms pertain to the hacking of stable
pseudonyms as well (perhaps to a lesser degree). For instance, in the much-cited
"Rape in Cyberspace" incident (as reported by Julian Dibbell, in which a male
individual took over a female's avatar and proceeded to engage in a virtual
sexual assault),170 the relevant individuals reported a strong sense of harm and a
real-world trauma (note that this case probably did not involve actual hacking
but abuse of an existing loophole in the system). Therefore, even those using
stable pseudonyms can suffer actual hardship when such breaches occur, which
in turn might transform into actionable legal rights. 171 In addition, for those
using pseudonyms or handles when engaging in e-commerce, the hijacking of
their digital identity could lead to serious financial losses, even though they are
confined to the online realm. Finally, the hacking of a stable pseudonym might
impact third parties. This will occur when third parties develop a relationship
(be it economic, personal, or social) with the stable pseudonym and rely upon
the information it conveys (regardless of the nature of the identity of the
physical individual behind it).
The second concern arising from identity intermediation addresses
situations in which a physical person's identity is assumed by another. Rather
than hijacking an existing account, the attacker creates a new account under the
name of another and thereafter impersonates her identity in the virtual realm.172
The detriments of this outcome are quite similar to those mentioned above. The
relevant victim suffers from the financial, social, and personal harms of
impersonation. Such harms have been found to compromise basic human rights
in some countries. In Germany, for instance, such damages are considered as
impeding on one's "right to a name"-a right provided in Section 12 of the
German Civil Code.173
170 Julian Dibbell, A Rape in Cyberspace: How an Evil Clown, a Haitian Trickster
Spirit, Two Wizards, and a Cast of Dozens Turned a Database into a Society, VILLAGE
VOICE (Oct. 18, 2005), http://www.villagevoice.com/2005-10-18/specials/a-rape-in-cyber
space/.
171 Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom To Design and Freedom To Play in Virtual
Worlds, 90 VA. L. REv. 2043, 2062-63 (2004) (addressing the applicability of tort and
speech related crimes in virtual spaces).
172At times, the "impersonator" chooses to generate an identity in the name of
another-but chooses to leave it dormant. Here the "impersonator" might be striving to
engage in "identity squatting"-causing the individual to pay the impersonator to provide
him or her access to the identity carrying their actual name. We will not be addressing this
specific matter in this Article.
173 BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Jan. 2, 2002,
BUNDESGESETZBLA~r [BGBL. I] at 2909, amended by BGBL. I at 1600 (Ger.). This powerful
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However, the damages in this situation are less severe than those noted
above. Here, the victim is not subjected to the actual sense of violation which
comes with the overtaking of an active persona. 174 On the other hand, the
damages here might be more severe to individuals who are unaware of the
impersonation. Such impersonation might transpire for a lengthy period of time
unbeknownst to them and for that reason users will not take action (as opposed
to the instance of identity hijacking which the individual can learn of quite
quickly given his inability to access his own account). In this case damages
could even exceed those of the previous variation discussed.
Impersonation may involve possible damages to third parties as well-all
similar to the damages discussed with regard to the concern above. Again, it is
difficult to ascertain which of these concerns is more severe. Intuitively,
damages of impersonation might be lighter, as the reliance on an identity
structured by an impersonator would be lesser than reliance upon an identity
structured by the actual individual and hacked at a specific point.175
Clearly, the impersonation here discussed is normatively problematic,
although legal issues are somewhat more complex for famous names, or for
those of celebrities. Assuming the identity of another, at times, might constitute
a political or social statement (and therefore to a certain degree allowed as a
form of satire even though damages to both the subject of impersonation and
third parties might follow).176
The concerns here noted are not only theoretical, but have reached the
courts as well. For example, news reports indicate the indictment of a New
Jersey woman who set up a fake Facebook page under her ex-boyfriend's (a
police officer) name. 177 She then proceeded to write derogatory comments (that
were therefore assumedly written by her ex).178 The woman was charged with
premise in German law can provide a fertile ground for causes of action. Indeed, in a recent
case in the Regional Court of Cologne, the court has responded to a celebrity's request, and
ordered Twitter to remove an account impersonating this celebrity. Oberlandesgerichte
[OLGZ] [Regional Court of Cologne] July 18, 2011, RECHTSPRECHUNG DER
OBERLANDESGERICHTE IN ZIVILSACHEN [31 0 396/11] (Ger.).
174 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 11.
175 As those familiar with the actual individual behind the online persona would be able
to notice that the identity is fraudulent, as opposed to instances of hacking, in which the
identity was initiated by the actual individual.
176 For a call for exceptions in identity theft and impersonation laws for these situations
in the state of Pennsylvania, which might include an exemption for parody, see Melissa
Daniels, Fake Facebook Profiles Could Be Criminalized, PA. INDEP. (Sept. 20, 2012), http://
paindependent.com/2012/09/fake-facebook-profiles-could-be-criminalized/. Note, however,
that this question is somewhat complicated in the age of "reality TV" and instant-celebrities.
177 Gregory J. Krieg, "Scum with a Gun ": Facebook Fraud Case Heats Up New Jersey,
ABC NEWS (Nov. 2, 2011, 6:13 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2011/1 1/scum-
with-a-gun-facebook-fraud-case-heats-up-new-jersey/; David Porter, NJ Woman Fights
Charge over Fake Facebook Page, N.J. NEWS (Oct. 26, 2011), http://abclocal.go.com/wabc/
story?section=news/local/newjersey&id=8407 195.
178 Porter, supra note 177.
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fourth degree identity theft.179 States such as California 80 and New Jersey have
amended existing statutes to specifically refer to these forms of impersonation
through social networks (these statutes require impersonation with the attempt
to cause harm, intimidate, threaten, or defraud as a cause of action).181
In many cases, the impersonation acts noted here also constitute a breach of
the identity intermediary's terms of use. When Real Name policies are applied,
the individual agrees that she is not misrepresenting herself when providing her
name and other personal information. Therefore, in these cases, upon learning
of the misrepresentation, the identity intermediary can subject the
impersonator/user to the relevant contractual remedies noted in the relevant
terms of use, which mostly also include the right to terminate the relevant
account. 182 Thus, the acts of private parties can potentially limit the problems at
hand.
Arguably, such actions also constitute a breach of anti-hacking laws (most
notably the CFAA)1 83 and therefore bring forth the civil and criminal sanctions
the law includes; when accessing an identity profile while providing false
information, one is possibly engaging in "unlawful access." While some
prosecutors have considered this legal construct, applying anti-hacking laws in
these cases might prove to be somewhat of a stretch.184
1791d.
180 These laws have already led to prosecutions of individuals setting up fake Facebook
pages under the name of others so as to intimidate them. See Ramasastry, supra note 159.
181 James Esposito, Woman Faces up to 18 Months in Prison for Fake Facebook Page,
KNowEM (Nov. 4, 2011), http://knowem.com/blog/2011/11/04/woman-faces-up-to-18-
months-in-prison-for-fake-facebook-page/.
182 See Statement ofRights and Responsibilities, supra note 41, § 4(1 -(2) (stating that a
user will not provide any false personal information on Facebook, or create an account for
anyone other than himself without permission, and will not create more than one personal
account). Section 4(10) stipulates that if user selects a username, or similar identifier, for her
account or Facebook page, Facebook reserves the right to remove or reclaim it if they find
such action appropriate. Id. § 4(10). Section 15 grants Facebook the right to stop providing
the user all or part of Facebook services if the user violates the letter or spirit of the
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, or otherwise creates risk or possible legal exposure
for Facebook. Id. § 15. The same section also stipulates that the aforementioned section 4
(amongst others) will apply even in such cases that Facebook's Statement of Rights and
Responsibilities shall terminate. Id.
183 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(ii) (2006).
184 See Orin S. Kerr, Should Faking a Name on Facebook Be a Felony, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 14, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI00014240531119032857045765622941161
60896.html. The nature of the law regarding the question as to whether breaching terms of
use could be considered "unlawful access" is unclear and courts are split on this issue,
especially in the employment context. See Lori Romer Stone, Using the Computer Fraud &
Abuse Act To Protect Law Firm Data, LAW PRAC. TODAY (Mar. 2012), http://www.ameri
canbar.org/publications/lawpractice-todayhome/lawpractice-todayarchive/marchl2/usi
ng-the-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act-to-protect-law-firm-data.html.
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While impersonation is a result of the malicious acts of a third party (setting
aside the case for satire and parody of the famous),185 it again is impacted by
the actions and oversights of the identity intermediary. Here, the problematic
outcome unfolded due to the intermediary's lack of successful identification and
authentication of the registering individuals. It is interesting to note that
although the concerns mentioned here and above might seem very similar to the
untrained eye, they result from very different potential omissions and inactions
on behalf of the identity intermediary. They therefore might call for different
regulatory responses.
Arguing that the damages and concerns here noted resulted from actions
and omissions of the identity intermediaries did not succeed in court. Beyond
suing the impersonators, at times victims turned to bring action against the
relevant platform themselves, but often met the brick wall of Section 230
immunity. In one famous case, Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.,186 a
"prankster" set up a fake profile for actress Christianne Carafano (of Star Trek
fame) on an online dating website (Matchmaker.com). He proceeded to also
include her real personal and contact information on her profile page, and noted
that she was seeking an "unconventional liaison." 87 Carafano sued the website
for defamation and other speech-related torts as well as for negligence.188 Yet
the court found that the website was not liable, while applying the
abovementioned Section 230.189 The court further noted that the website did not
encourage this outcome in any way.190 Below we will examine whether these
legal outcomes should be reconsidered.
Finally, we examine this "impersonation" concern in light of the Real
Name/Specific Pseudonym distinction. Clearly, the concerns noted pertain to
identity intermediaries applying Real Names. Here, one user can clearly register
185 For arguments to assure that free speech interests are protected while moving to limit
the concerns here discussed, see Ramasastry, supra note 159.
186 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003).
187 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
1881d at 1055. The negligence claim is discussed in depth by the District Court. It
explains that the negligence claim "stems from the alleged injurious falsehood of the
Profile." Id. at 1077. Yet because the defamation claim fails in view of lack of "malice"
(given the fact that this was a public figure) the negligence argument cannot stand. Id. at
1073. The court did not accept the argument that damages here go beyond the defaming
words stated (as opposed to the text and analysis above that notes other sources of damages
beyond these actual words). Id. at 1072.
General negligence claims are often dismissed on the basis of the "immunity"
provided by Section 230 of the CDA. See David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for
Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, 43 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 373, 452 (2010) (noting, as an example,
Doe v. MySpace, 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 852 (W.D. Tex. 2007)).
189 Carafano, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 1064.
190 Another famous Section 230 case involved a similar fact pattern. Barnes v. Yahoo!,
Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 2009). In Barnes v. Yahoo!, a false identity was created
and Yahoo! chose not to remove it. Id. at 1098. The court again found that Section 230
immunity would apply yet found for the plaintiff based on other claims. Id. at 1109.
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an ID and impersonate another. A difficult question arises as to whether these
issues might pertain to Specific Pseudonyms. This issue might arise when an
individual has a well-accepted "handle," which is registered by someone else in
another virtual realm. In these cases, the damages of such actions can impact
both victims and third parties relying upon the false pseudonymous profile, yet
they may be somewhat farfetched.
The third element of this discussion provides yet another variation of
concerns related to inaccurate identity intermediation-identity
misrepresentation. In this case, there is no victim of impersonation or hacking-
the damages are confined to third parties.191 This concern comes about when a
user creates an identity which does not exist. It should be noted that a similar
concern arises when an individual purposefully misrepresents various personal
traits in his or her profile. This latter concern is often noted in the context of
dating websites, where users often include "white lies" regarding their weight,
height, or age in their profile (in this case, the social norm might actually allow
for such inaccuracies). 192 For this Article, we will merely focus on the first
example (and the issue of "identity misrepresentation") rather than the latter. As
our discussion focuses on the responsibility and possible liability of the
intermediary, considering the broader implications of this final example within
our analysis leads to substantial difficulties; would it be possible to require that
identity intermediaries authenticate every personal factor set forth by a user?
This issue also takes us beyond the core of our discussion (identity) and into
examining the importance of verifying various personal traits. 193
As mentioned, the concerns noted here only pertain to third parties who
might have relied upon the identity misrepresentations and acted accordingly.
Such false reliance might cause commercial loss and other damages that are far
more severe. Yet beyond those interacting with the misrepresenting party, such
actions undermine trust throughout the relevant virtual realm, and thereafter the
loss of all the various gains identity intermediation can bring about.
191 For a discussion of such instances in the offline realm, see supra note 160.
192 In some cases, such misrepresentations on dating websites (especially with regard to
age) lead to serious criminal charges, such as statutory rape. In this context, courts have
explored the liability of dating websites for these unfortunate outcomes. See for instance
Doe v. SexSearch.com, 551 F.3d 412, 415 (6th Cir. 2008) (court examined whether website
made binding representations regarding age authentication and rejected this claim). The
issue of age verification (and negligence to do so) was also addressed in Doe v. MySpace,
Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 2008) (court rejected claim that MySpace was negligent
when engaging in age verification).
193 We concede that the line between mere and identity misrepresentations is blurry at
best. For instance, when an individual misrepresents that she lives at a specific location or
owns a specific establishment, should such actions be considered as identity
misrepresentation? On its face the answer is negative. However, what if the misrepresented
factor is related to very few individuals and these actual trait holders are known? Arguably
these instances probably feature identity misrepresentation as well (even though such
intermediation is merely implicit). We thank James Grimmelmann for articulating this point.
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The most famous and tragic example of this concern relates to the story of
Lori Drew. 194 Drew was worried that a teenager, Megan Meier, was spreading
gossip about her daughter. Drew created a fictitious identity--"Josh Evans"-
who befriended Megan Meier only later to break up with her, and insult her.195
Consequently, Megan Meier took her own life.196 Here, the process of identity
misrepresentation caused Megan to rely upon the actions of "Josh" and form a
close attachment, which Drew abused. This entire dynamic resulted from a
failure in the identity intermediation process.197
More recently, other, less severe cases have unfolded in the national press.
Even a specific term-catfishing-has been coined to address "[t]he
phenomenon of internet predators that fabricate online identities and entire
social circles to trick people into emotional/romantic relationships (over a long
period of time)." 98 For instance, Manti Te'o, a college football star, was duped
into a courtship with a fake girlfriend, Lennay Kekua, who "died" just before a
crucial game.199
As noted above, new laws have been set in place to deal with various
concerns related to online impersonation-especially in social networks. Yet, as
legal experts opined with regard to the Te'o affair,200 legal action against the
initiator of a false profile under these new laws is difficult. The anti-
impersonation laws, by nature, call for impersonation of an actual person-an
element missing in this example. 201 Another possible strategy explored in the
Drew case is prosecuting those engaged in identity misrepresentation using anti-
hacking laws. Here the argument will state that the individuals engaged in
"unlawful access," by using the intermediary system while breaching its terms
of use (for instance, using a false name rather than a real one). The court in
194 Drew was indicted and eventually acquitted of computer fraud claims. United States
v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 468 (C.D. Cal. 2009). The indictment was premised upon Drew's
breach of MySpace's contractual terms in opening and operating the account. Id. at 457. The
court found that the prohibitions on negative behavior in the MySpace ToS were too "vague"
to be the basis of a criminal indictment. Id. at 465-66.
195 Id. at 452.
196 Id.
197 Note again that, in some cases, it would be difficult to establish whether a tragic
outcome resulted from an identity or other misrepresentation. For instance, in a case in
which an individual encourages others to commit suicide in related chatrooms, while
claiming he is a clergyman or doctor.
198 Zimmerman v. Bd. of Trs. of Ball State Univ., No. 1:12-cv-01475-JMS-DML, 2013
WL 1619532, at *14 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 15, 2013) (citation omitted).
199 Victor Luckerson, Can You Go to Jail for Impersonating Someone Online?, TIME,
Jan. 22, 2013, http://business.time.com/2013/01/22/can-you-go-to-jail-for-impersonating-
someone-online/.
200Jd
201 Some commentators noted that changing these laws to bring cases against these
actors might infringe upon their free speech and thus prove to be unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Bradley Shear, Notre Dame, Manti Te'o, Catfishing, Online Impersonation, and the Law,
SHEAR ON Soc. MEDIA L. (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.shearsocialmedia.com/2013/01/notre-
dame-manti-teo-catfishing-online.html.
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Drew rejected this claim. 202 However, with some alterations, this argument
might be used again in the future. In addition, there is the option of bringing a
variety of tort claims against users for these abuses. 203
The role (and fault) of the intermediary in this context is similar to the one
noted in the context of impersonation. In effect, had the identity intermediary
assured that the identities assumed through the intermediation process were
"real" and the identifying information was accurate, some of the problems noted
in this section would have been avoided. Note however that the task
intermediaries face here is different and sets forth serious challenges. In this
context, the firm cannot rely upon victims of impersonation to come forth and
report fake profiles (because there are no such persons). In addition, they will be
unable to "quiz" individuals using information they collected elsewhere about
them (as indeed there is no such information). In fact, courts are reluctant to
order intermediaries to carry out these verification tasks. For instance, this issue
was recently discussed in a class action brought against Match.com. 204 In this
case, plaintiffs argued that many of the dating website's profiles were a fake.205
The legal arguments were generally premised upon breaches of actual and
implied contractual promises made by the dating website. 206 Given the fact that
Match.com specifically notes that it does not carry out any background checks,
the court easily rejected this claim. 207 It is fair to assume that in other cases,
which will not be premised upon a contractual framework, intermediaries will
again benefit from Section 230 immunity. Below we will examine how law
should address this set of concerns.
Again, upon conclusion, we must examine whether these concerns of
identity misrepresentation pertain to Stable Pseudonyms as well or only Real
Names. At first blush, the issue here discussed can probably only relate to the
intermediation of Real Names. Only in these contexts can one state that a legal
expectation regarding the authenticity of the identified individual exists. When
interacting in a pseudonymous environment, it is difficult to assert that there is
an expectation that the individual is "real." Yet environments with stable
pseudonyms can generate very interesting concerns and possible legal claims
regarding the failure of intermediation. For instance, a possible concern might
arise when it becomes apparent that a pseudonymous identity is not powered by
202 See discussion supra note 194.
203 Possible tort claims are: intentional infliction of emotional distress,
misrepresentation, and perhaps negligence. These claims at times fail because of the inability
to prove actual damages.
204 Robinson v. Match.com, LLC, No. 3:10-cv-2651-L, 2012 WL 3263992, at *1 (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 10, 2012).205 1d. at *5.
2061d at *5-8.
207 See discussion and analysis in Ramasastry, supra note 159; Nate
Raymond, Match. com Lawsuit 2012 Throw Out: Disgruntled Daters Find No Love in Court,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/10/matchcom-
lawsuit-2012 n_1766115.html.
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a human, but merely a bot208 (a problem which might be resolved using some
form of a Turing test upon registration). In other cases, individuals created
virtual identities which were inflicted with terrible troubles (some of which they
eventually "killed") while others followed the outcomes with worry and
empathy, only later to learn that these identities were fake.209 These examples
demonstrate the difficulty of distinguishing between acts that are illegal and
those that are merely morally and ethically unacceptable or perhaps only in bad
taste, yet still must be allowed and even protected so as to promote free speech
objectives. Therefore, establishing the liability of identity intermediaries in this
context and with regard to Stable Pseudonyms is a very difficult task.
2. Virtual Property Rights, Publicity, and Dignity: Intermediary
Discretion, Interoperability, and Mobility
The identity-related harms arising from the intermediation process can
result from a very different set of problems. Not only can concerns arise from
other problematic users, whose actions might be enabled by the intermediaries'
neglect. In some cases, concerns are derived from the direct actions and policies
of the intermediary itself. To understand this point, we focus on the contractual
and technological relationship between the user and the identity intermediary.210
Here, we must establish whether we might allow markets to unfold as they may,
or, whether law must intervene by limiting the remedies the intermediary might
exercise toward users and perhaps even add mandatory requirements (be they
technological or contractual) which the intermediaries must fulfill.
The interests related to the concerns here discussed are premised upon a
somewhat different theoretical context than those addressed above. Here, we
mostly reflect upon instances in which users engage in the extensive and
intensive use of their virtual identity, and by doing so develop a close
attachment to it. The importance and significance of this connection could be
articulated in economic terms; if users apply these virtual identities to
commerce, loss of control over them could be translated into financial loss. Yet
the usage patterns noted at times generate an even closer attachment between
the user and the relevant identity-one that users believe should be translated
into a certain degree of "control" over their profile-or even a property right.211
Other users might see these rights as a form of "personality right," or perhaps
208 See discussion in Bernal, supra note 147, at 16.209 See, e.g., Esther Addley, Syrian Lesbian Blogger Is Revealed Conclusively To Be a
Married Man, GUARDIAN, June 12, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/13/
syrian-lesbian-blogger-tom-macmaster; Tracy Spaight, Who Killed Miss Norway, in THE
STATE OF PLAY 189 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds., 2006).
2 10 For a discussion as to the relation between online technological design and contract,
see generally Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635
(2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1808108.
211 See discussion in Rundle et al., supra note 81, at 9-10.
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somewhat of a blend of property and personality interests. 212 The relationship
between user and profile/identity is strengthened as users add information to the
relevant identity (such as photos or text) and formulate valuable social ties. In
some cases, such as those of virtual worlds, the profile might include virtual
goods of actual value. In addition, allowing users to exercise control (and
providing them with assurances they will be able to do so) will also promote the
general personal and social benefits discussed in Part IV.A supra.
While individual users have an interest in controlling their identity and will
therefore argue for maintaining such ability, intermediaries have interests of
their own. The intermediaries' commercial interests might provide substantial
incentives for maintaining a broad prerogative to limit or even sever the users'
control, at will. 213 This conflict leads to points of contention where identity
interests might come into play and legal intervention is needed. We will hereby
address three such points pertaining to the right and ability to engage in
termination and deletion, interoperability, and mobility of the online identity
and profile.
Perhaps the most intuitive capacity linked to "controlling" the relevant elD
is the ability to use it. This ability, or even "right," conflicts with the
intermediaries' almost unfettered ability to terminate the identity at their
discretion. Most contractual frameworks between identity intermediaries and
their users include broad termination clauses. These allow intermediaries to
disconnect the users when various alleged contractual breaches are found.214
Law perhaps must intervene in this contractual relationship, rather than merely
uphold it.215
A lesser concern arises when the intermediary might alter the identity-based
profile, deleting parts of it at its discretion. Again firms can do so, on the basis
of broad discretion provided in the terms of use. Furthermore, Section 230 of
the CDA allows firms to remove information when acting in good faith (which
is broadly construed).216 Thus, users have very limited claims to set forth if
212 On the relation and interaction between property and personhood in this context, see
Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, Striking a Balance Between Property and Personality:
The Case of the Avatars, 1 J. VIRTUAL WORLDS REs., Feb. 2009, at 3, 11, 14, available at
http://joumals.tdl.org/jvwr/index.php/jvwr/article/view/362/423.
213 See discussion in Grimmelmann, supra note 83, at 429 as to the intermediaries'
incentives to generate user dependence and lock-in.
2 14 Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 41, § 15 (granting Facebook the
right to stop providing the user all or part of Facebook services if the user violates the letter
or spirit of the Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, or otherwise creates risk or possible
legal exposure for Facebook).
215 For a different opinion, finding that contractual language should prevail, see Eric
Goldman, Online User Account Termination and 47 U.S. C § 230(c)(2), 2 U.C. IRVINE L.
REv. 659, 670 (2012) (arguing that broad termination rights to providers are sound policy,
and that such rights could actually be derived from Section 230 itself, which should even be
broadened to allow greater termination rights).
216 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(2)(a) (2006); see discussion in Goldman, supra note 215, at 660,
662.
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content they themselves authored is removed from their profile. These outcomes
however should be reconsidered in view of the interests here addressed.
Issues of proper intermediation have already arisen in a context where the
interests of users are of perhaps greatest significance-virtual worlds.217 In one
incident broadly reported in the literature, Electronic Arts ("EA," the operators
of "The Sims Online") terminated Peter Ludlow's account and removed him
from the game. The parties disagreed as to the real reason behind this step. EA
argued it took this aggressive step because Ludlow included a link to an
external website (an act the terms of service (ToS) prohibited). Ludlow-an
avid user of the Sims platform-claimed it was because of his critique of the
way EA managed the system.2 18 Whether the truth is with Ludlow or EA is
beside the point. This example is merely a demonstration as to the ease with
which the intermediary can exercise excessive force, while compromising
important interests of the user. Another case which already reached the courts is
that of Marc Bragg and the virtual world "Second Life." Here again Linden
Labs, the website operator, terminated the user's cherished account.219 The
parties disagreed as to whether the user breached the website's terms of service,
and whether the use of the "account termination" remedy was balanced and
proper at this juncture. 220 While the case was ultimately settled, the court
addressed and ruled on the issue of the mandatory arbitration provision included
in the ToS.22 1 In doing so, the court did not accept the arbitration terms set out
in the ToS, while indicating this contract was one of adhesion. 222
Disputes and concerns addressing the specific interests here discussed need
not only arise in view of the aggressive actions of the intermediary. They might
also arise from the intermediaries' effective "locking" of the user into one realm
of intermediation. In other words, we refer to the lack of interface
interoperability and user mobility the platforms might exhibit. Interoperability
2 17 See Goldman, supra note 215, at 660.
2 18 See discussion in Balkin, supra note 171, at 2075.
219 Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 595 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
220 d.22 1 Id. at 603- 12.
222Id. at 606-12. In this case, Bragg apparently acquired virtual land in an improper
manner. Id. at 597. In the sections of the case ruled upon, the court set aside a binding
arbitration agreement, finding it to be unconscionable. Id. at 611. As part of the analysis, the
court noted that "[o]wning property in and having access to this virtual world is, moreover,
apparently important to the plaintiff in this case." Id. at 595. In addition, when examining
whether the terms of service are a contract of adhesion the court noted that there were no
"reasonably available market alternatives [to defeat] a claim of adhesiveness." Id. at 606. A
possible problem with this attempt to extrapolate from the Bragg decision to the broader
notion of protecting identity interests from the actions of intermediaries is that this case
involved actual financial harms, rather than strictly virtual ones. Bragg spent "real" money
in "Second Life" to acquire virtual goods. Upon cancelling the account, these goods
evaporated. However, we believe that the points made by the court here could be easily
expanded to instances in which the damages cannot be reduced to dollars and cents, but can
be articulated through notions of autonomy and dignitary harms.
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here refers to the intermediary platform's ability to effectively interact with
other identity platforms or intermediaries, while allowing users to benefit from
the services and features made available on these other sites.223 Interoperability
allows for fully exercising the (personality, property, or other) rights here
discussed. Yet, firms (especially the large ones) have limited incentives to
provide or even enable interoperability. They rather weaken their smaller
competitors and hope to gain their market share after they fail. Mobility (or
portability) refers to a similar-yet more extreme-notion. Achieving
portability would allow users to terminate their relationships with their identity
intermediary with limited costs and harm. When doing so, the user would be
able to transport his identity and profile from one platform to another. Again,
large and successful firms clearly have limited incentives to provide such
abilities. Thus, law might be required to intervene.
Without the ability to engage in interoperability or mobility, users are
unable to exercise "control" over their identity rights. Rather, they must solely
interact within the confines designated by the intermediary. They are also de
facto restricted from moving to another platform, given the high costs of such a
move; with no mobility, opting for another platform will require leaving their
content and contacts behind and starting a new identity.
Calls for assuring and promoting interoperability and mobility have already
been raised in the legal discourse when discussing the regulation of internet
intermediaries. They are often mentioned in the context of competition law
(although their wisdom has, at times, been questioned). 224 They have also been
recently set forth as part of users' privacy (or data protection) rights and ability
to control personal information pertaining to them.225 In other instances (such as
that of cell phone operators), data mobility has been promoted as a measure of
consumer protection. 226 Yet promoting interoperability and mobility can also be
justified by the personality-based theories and objectives here discussed. The
ability to exercise interoperability and mobility could be understood as a
22 3 Grimmelmann, supra note 83, at 429-30.
224See Peter Swire & Yianni Lagos, Why the Right to Data Portability Likely Reduces
Consumer Welfare: Antitrust and Privacy Critique, 72 MD. L. REv. 335, 337-40 (2013). For
the DRM Context, see Tal Z. Zarsky, Assessing Alternative Compensation Models for
Online Content Consumption, 84 DENV. U. L. REv. 645, 659 (2006).
225 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of Such Data, at 53, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012)
[hereinafter EU 2012 Proposal], available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protect
ion/document/review2012/com2012_11 en.pdf; see also discussion in Swire & Lagos,
supra note 224, at 336-37. In fact, the draft Data Protection Regulation, published in
January 2012 and aimed at revising and replacing the EU Directive, explicitly enshrines in
Article 18 "a right to data portability." See discussion in Paul De Hert & Vagelis
Papkonstantinou, The Proposed Data Protection Regulation Replacing Directive 95/46/EC:
A Sound System for the Protection of Individuals, 28 COMPUTER L. & SECEURITY REv. 130,
137-38 (2012).22 6 BAR-GILL, supra note 71, at 243-44.
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manifestation of a crucial segment of property's "bundle of rights"-the right of
alienability 227 or the ability to control one's information and persona to the
greatest degree possible.228
We conclude by examining whether the rights and concerns here discussed
pertain to Real Names and/or Stable Pseudonyms. For some of the issues-such
as content and contacts lost due to the intermediaries' actions-there seems to
be little difference. In other contexts, the rights of Stable Pseudonyms require
additional protection. Those using Real Names can easily "export" some of
their reputational capital out of the identity system operated by the
intermediary; those striving to contact them could do so in other ways. Yet for
those using a stable and unique pseudonym, silencing or limiting their use of
this identity by the intermediary (through limiting portability or even
termination) amounts to the individual's total loss of control-there is no simple
way this point of control could be routed around. For that reason, perhaps
additional forms of legal protection are called for in the Stable Pseudonym
context.
C. Interim Summary: Identity Intermediaries, Concerns and the Law-
Taking Stock and Looking Forward
As our discussion thus far shows, the emergence of soft elD intermediaries
is generating an abundance of novel benefits, as well as problems and concerns.
These concerns arise in a setting where commercial entities are in a position of
power. Therefore a discussion of legal intervention at this juncture is crucial.
Yet some would argue against aggressive and active legal intervention.
They would note that the problems here discussed are mostly minor and easily
manageable through existing laws. They might also be resulting from a passing
trend, and regulation in this context usually proves futile. Technologies move
ahead, rendering the law quickly irrelevant. Moreover, the law might stifle
innovative practices. Therefore, law should strive to remain as "neutral" as
possible, rather than end up picking winners. Finally, those objecting to legal
intervention will state that market pressures have a good chance of regulating
these matters on their own, as market players adapt their technologies and
business plans to meet the users' preferences and tastes.
Rather than a fad, we believe the current shift toward soft elD
intermediation and the novel problems it brings about are only the beginning of
a greater movement coming in the next few years. In the future, we might see a
shift of additional identification and verification roles to these realms-in both
227 One should not confuse the right to shift from one platform to another with the right
to sell one's personality right. Recognizing the latter calls for a deeper discussion and
considering the potential problems of commodification. See generally Rothman, supra note
139.228 NSTIC REPORT, supra note 35, at 25.
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commercial and governmental settings. 229 For instance, we might have state
voting via Facebook (in some states you can already use the site to register).230
The growing use of tablets and smart phones as mobile means of
communication and transaction will call for additional identification schemes
making use of these technologies, thus leading to additional sets of problems. 231
Furthermore, the markets for these forms of intermediation might be
consolidating. Therefore, market forces will most likely fail to lead to an
optimal outcome. One of the moves toward consolidation is the introduction of
Facebook's "Open Graph" (or "Facebook Connect"). 232 This tool enables
Facebook identity intermediation on a variety of platforms.233 Thus, we will see
several soft identity intermediaries gaining dominance, and as a result, we will
lose the benefits of market forces which are attentive to consumer interests. In
such a case, law and policy must step in.
Even if markets were to remain competitive, the issues here discussed call
for legal scrutiny and even intervention in many cases, as the markets here
discussed are probably deemed to fail for two main reasons. First, note the non-
salience problem. 234 Even if the concerns addressed in Part IV.B above appear
serious after the fact, there is a good chance that individuals will tend to
underestimate the pertinent contractual provisions and technical measures
which enabled them ex ante (that is, when creating the soft elD). In other words,
users will agree to terms of use which will shield the intermediaries from the
liability the concerns mentioned generate and to technological settings which
generate vulnerabilities. Users will tend to do so, as they will focus their
attention on other contractual and factual attributes. This will leave these
important issues unattended, thus requiring governmental intervention.
Second is the collective action problem. The examples above note upsetting
and drastic cases. However, in many other instances, the identity harms caused
are not as serious. A one-time hack, an impersonator that stopped after a short
time, or an interaction with a bot-these might all indeed cause aggravation and
harm. Yet they will probably not generate sufficient user motivation to engage
in a lawsuit against the identity intermediary (and possibly not even a
complaint). Here one must also note that such legal actions carry considerable
229 For a discussion on the merits and drawbacks of using social networking services for
government elD in Europe, see Aaron K. Martin & Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade,
Friending the Taxman: On the Use of Social Networking Services for Government elD in
Europe, 37 TELECOMM. POL'Y (forthcoming 2013).
230 Jacob Porter, Facebook Voter Registration by Washington State Will Become
Commonplace, PoLICYMIC (2012), http://www.policymic.com/articles/11484/facebook-vo
ter-registration-by-washington-state-will-become-commonplace. Note that this process does
not involve identity intermediation.
231 See NSTIC REPORT, supra note 35, at 25.232 See Justin Lafferty, What Can Facebook's Open Graph Do?, ALLFACEBOOK (Sept.
18, 2012, 3:59 PM), http://allfacebook.com/what-can-facebooks-open-graph-do-b99921.
233 Sdi
234 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
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costs, especially given the fact that the intermediaries are often located at a
distant location or even country.235 Therefore, the intermediaries will not
internalize the full extent of the damages they inflict in view of high litigation
costs (as well as high coordination costs among potential plaintiffs) and the
spread of damages across the broader population. In this case, law and
regulation must intervene.
Even after recognizing that law should play a larger role in the regulation of
soft ellD intermediaries, we must decide what the nature of that role would be.
There are three forms of possible regulatory steps: limited, responsive, and
strategic. A limited response is very similar to the current U.S. legal strategy:
general deference to market forces, while focusing on the pursuance of third
parties which generated the concerns noted (such as the account hijacker or
impersonator). However, law can also adopt a responsive role, which is led by
the courts. Here, courts might find that the intermediaries are liable for the
concerns mentioned and the damages that followed. Thus, they will take action
either by assigning liability, or striking down specific provisions in the
intermediaries' terms of service. It is possible, however, that this approach is
insufficient. Given the ever-changing nature of the problem at hand, the slow
responses of courts, and their limited technical expertise, a more aggressive
approach might be called for.
That brings us to law's strategic role. Lawmakers and regulators can move
to resolve the concerns here addressed in a more aggressive manner. For
instance, they might set clear guidelines as to the acceptable practices of
relevant firms-practices that they believe will generate stability and trust.
Although somewhat unfitting for a technological context, we are already seeing
such action in the broader context of data security.236 In addition, with regard to
privacy law (an issue which shares many attributes with the one here
addressed), regulators in both the United States237 and the EU 238 are moving to
implement "Privacy by Design"239-a strategic regulatory response which calls
for structuring technology in a way which would enforce privacy principles and
235 Note that the extent of this problem is affected by the willingness of courts to uphold
jurisdiction clauses in the intermediaries' terms of use. While this is an important issue, we
choose to set it aside for this analysis.
236 See Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on Data Security Before
the Comm. on Energy and Commerce Subcomm. on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade
U.S. H. of Reps., 112th Cong. 22-23 (2011) (statement of David C. Vladeck, Director,
Bureau of Consumer Protection), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/05/pdf/1 10504
datasecurityhouse.pdf. In addition, the State of Massachusetts has set standards as to proper
technological steps to be taken to guard the security of personal data. See Standards for the
Protection of Personal Information of Residents of the Commonwealth, MAsS.Gov,
http://www.mass.gov/ago/doing-business-in-massachusetts/privacy-and-data-security/stand
ards-for-the-protection-of-personal.html (last visited July 21, 2013).
237 FTC REPORT, supra note 87, at 22-32.2 38 EU2012 Proposal, supra note 225, art. 30(3) at 60.
239See discussion in Ira S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1409, 1421-31, 1436-39 (2011).
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limit future harms. Thus, law is indeed striving to take a more active role which
will limit concerns ex ante, rather than punishing and compensating ex post.
What path must law follow in the context of soft elDs? To try to gain
additional insights to this issue, we look to the EU which faced a similar
problem more than a decade ago. When striving to deal with the emergence of
digital elDs, the EU adopted the eSig Directive.240 This directive made use of
both the regulatory and strategic responses, with interesting variations.241 It
would be helpful to examine what we can learn from the EU experience, and
examine whether the structure used is fitting to the novel setting of soft elD
intermediaries (which are clearly outside the Directive's scope). It is also
helpful to note that the existing eSig Directive is under review in the EU, with
the prospect that its scope will be considerably expanded. Thus it would be
interesting to contemplate and consider whether this legal structure can be used
(after proper amendments) for the regulation of soft elD intermediaries. We
therefore turn to discuss the EU eSig Directive as well as its critiques and
failures. We also address two additional novel governmental steps, both in the
United States and the EU, which closely coincide with some of the eSig
Directive general themes.
V. THE LAW AND/OF ID INTERMEDIARIES: AN EU PERSPECTIVE THROUGH
THE ESIG PRISM
A. The E-Signature Directive in a Nutshell
In 1999, the European Parliament and Council enacted Directive
1999/93/EC. 242 This Directive established a legal framework for electronic
signatures and certification services.243 The Directive was broadly adopted,
with variations, by the Member States. 244 The Directive operates on several
dimensions. First, it clarifies the legal standing and validity of these
technologieS245-both in the context of evidentiary rules and formal
requirements for contract formation (or, in other words, indicates when a digital
signature could serve the same purposes as a handwritten one). As noted above,
the United States has introduced similar laws.246
Next, the Directive applies a three-part taxonomy for mapping out the realm
of signatures, identification, and authentication. The Directive does so by
referring to "Electronic Signatures," "Advanced Electronic Signatures," and
"Qualified Advanced Electronic Signatures." 247 The first term refers to the most
240 Directive 1999/93/EC, supra note 42, at 12.24 1Id. arts. 1-15, at 14-17.
242 See id at 12.
243 See id. art. 5, at 15.
244 Jos DUMORTIER ET AL., supra note 60, § 1.2.1, at 4-8.245 Directive 1999/93/EC, supra note 42, art. 5, at 15.
246 See Froomkin, supra note 65, at 9-12.247 See Directive 1999/93/EC, supra note 42, M 19-20, at 13.
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basic technological measure (even if completely unsecure) of authentication. 248
This might even include the process of signing an email message.249 The next
two options, however, rely on more elaborate schemes for identification and
authentication.
The Directive introduces the concept of "Qualified Advanced Electronic
Signatures" in Article 5.1.250 To receive the "Qualification" standing, the
Directive implements an aggressive, command-and-control form of
regulation. 251 For that, government sets in place mandatory technological
requirements. 252 In addition, the Directive introduces the concept of "Advanced
Electronic Signatures." 253 For entering this category, the Directive calls for a
process of voluntary accreditation (as explained in Article 3.2).254 Here, the
regulator sets up a regulatory approval scheme which firms, at their discretion,
may enter so as to receive a stamp of quality.255 This accreditation process
could be carried out by either a public or private entity, so long as it is
introduced by a Member State.256 Yet those operating an "Advanced Electronic
Signature" scheme are permitted to proceed without joining these voluntary
schemes.257 Therefore, the Directive introduces two innovative and strategic
steps: a mandatory and voluntary pre-approval process for the use of ID
intermediaries.258
The Directive introduces another strategic step, by striving to promote
"harmonization." 259 In EU documents (as in this case), this term usually refers
to assuring that laws governing a specific issue are similar within the Union.260
Yet given the technological context, "harmonization" carries an additional
meaning. The drafters feared the situation in which individuals move from one
Member State to another while losing the ability to use their original
authentication service.261 Thus, "harmonization" refers to the technological
concept of interoperability.
Finally, the Directive addresses the "responsive" role of law in Article 6, by
noting the liability of service providers in the identity intermediation
markets. 262 It states the "qualified" intermediary's liability for not conveying
24 8 Id. art. 2(1), at 14.
249Id.a
250Id. art. 5(1), at 15.
251Id. art. 5, at 15.
252 Id
253 Directive 1999/93/EC, supra note 42, art. 2(2), at 14.
254Id. art. 3(2), at 15.
255 Id256 1d. art. 2(13), at 14.257 Id. 12, at 13.258 1d. art. 3, at 15.
259 Directive 1999/93/EC, supra note 42, art. 12, at 17.
260 Commission Report, supra note 59, § 3.3.2, at 7.
261 Directive 1999/93/EC, supra note 42, 5, at 12.
262Id. art. 6, at 15-16.
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the revocation of a signature and other elements. 263 It does so, however, while
recognizing the intermediary's ability to limit (to some extent) their liability
contractually. 264 It also recognizes the ability to strike down unfair contractual
terms. 265
The Directive applies several interesting "strategic" responses which might
be further considered for the regulation of soft elDs. Yet, expanding the ideas
set forth in the EU eSig Directive might not constitute the best strategy. While
the scope of online actions and transactions has grown exponentially, laws
regulating electronic signatures have not substantially contributed to such
growth. The Directive and subsequent laws have not generated much interest
and traction. 266 This finding has not escaped the EU authorities, who moved to
issue several reports to examine this apparent failure. These noted that Member
States have enacted relevant laws to transpose the Directive's general principles
and rules. Yet beyond some uses in private banking, the central realm of
relevance for both the directive and the state laws is that of e-Government. In
this context several follow-up regulatory structures were introduced, such as
those pertaining to public procurement. 267 However, the overall failure in the
commercial sector is quite clear.
There are varied reasons for the Directive's relative failure to substantially
affect online commerce and trust. The use of digital signatures requires time,
understanding of technology, and a grasp of complex concepts of cryptology.
These all might be beyond the reach of the average busy online user, who
therefore simply ignores these secure intermediation tools.268 In addition, the
Directive was set in place with a specific vision of the online realm in mind. Yet
the e-commerce market (and the Internet in general) developed in unpredictable
ways. These developments generated limited incentives for business models
promoting the use of digital signatures and other advanced identification models
the drafters of the Directive envisioned.269 As in other contexts, it appears that
the public is reluctant to spend money to promote its privacy. It is also possible
that the Directive was not aggressive enough in solidifying the legal standing of
263 Id
264Id. arts. 6(3)-6(4), at 16.2 65 Id. art. 6(5), at 16.
266 Commission Report, supra note 59, § 3.3.2, at 7-8; Jos DUMORTIER ET AL., supra
note 60, § 1.2.1, at 4-8.
267 Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March
2004 Coordinating the Procurement Procedures of Entities Operating in the Water, Energy,
Transport and Postal Services Sectors, 2004 O.J. (L 134) 1; see also Directive 2004/18/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the Coordination of
Procedures for the Award of Public Works Contracts, Public Supply Contracts and Public
Service Contracts, 2004 O.J. (L 134) 114.
268 For a similar argument, see Jos DUMORTIER ET AL., supra note 60, § 4.3, at 134.
269 Commission Report, supra note 59, § 3.3.2, at 7-8.
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online identity authorization. 270 We will bear these reasons in mind when
considering the next steps to be taken for soft elDs.
B. ESig Regulation: The Next Step on Both Sides of the Atlantic-
Expanding the eSig Directive and the National Strategy for Trusted
Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC)
As a substantial amount of time has passed since the introduction of the
eSig Directive, it is helpful to point to recent developments regarding this
matter. In the EU, the existing eSig Directive is under review. As part of this
process, EU policymakers are considering ways to incorporate this Directive
into a broader strategy to promote "Identification, Authentication and
Signature" (IAS). In doing so, the Commission has opted for a new
Regulation-that of "Electronic Trust Services." 271 Note that this legal
instrument provides greater certainty as it is immediately applicable to all EU
Member States. In this respect, one of the central objectives of the proposed
Regulation is to promote harmonization and mobility among Member States for
citizens making use of various identification and authentication measures. 272
To achieve these objectives, the new regulatory framework calls for
"mutual recognition" of elDs;273 states are free to select which elD platforms
could be used for their public services, and notify the EU Commission of such
selection. 274 Yet they must then recognize and accept the elD systems other
states have selected as well, so as to enable user mobility and
interoperability. 275 While the proposed Regulation will be considerably broader
270 There might be other, speculative, reasons as well. For instance, the governments'
insistence on maintaining a backdoor key to many of these systems discouraged users from
engaging with these technologies. They perhaps understood that their actions and
transactions were not really secure. See Froomkin, supra note 65, at 37.
271 See Proposal for a Regulation on Electronic Identification and Trust Services for
Electronic Transactions in the Internal Market, 1 17, at 14, COM (2012) 238 final (June 4,
2012) [hereinafter Proposal for a Regulation].
272 The new framework for electronic identification and electronic trust services will:
ensure mutual recognition and acceptance of electronic identification across borders; give
legal effect and mutual recognition to trust services including enhancing current rules on e-
signatures and providing a legal framework for electronic seals, time stamping, electronic
document acceptability, electronic delivery, and website authentication. For more
information, see Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Draft Regulation on Electronic Identification
and Trusted Services for Electronic Transactions in the Internal Market (Sept. 20, 2012),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/draft-regulation-electronic-identifica
tion-and-trusted-services-electronic-transactions-0.
273 Proposal for a Regulation, supra note 271, § 1, at 2, § 3.3.2, at 5.274 1d §3.3.2, at 5.275 Id
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than the existing eSig directive, it would most likely still not pertain and govern
the commercial entities defined as soft elD intermediaries above.276
The issue of eD intermediation has also caught the attention of the highest
level of government in the United States as in this context, the White House
issued its National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC)
report.277 The project's guiding principles are privacy, security, interoperability,
and ease-of-use. 278 It focuses on the emergence and development of an "identity
ecosystem"-"an online environment where individuals and organizations will
be able to trust each other because they follow agreed upon standards to obtain
and authenticate their digital identities." 279 The report is quite general in its
discussion and calls for a multiyear project of examining these matters. 280 It
launches an extensive initiative (NSTIC) to be headed by the Department of
Commerce to achieve the objectives noted.281 Given its scope, it could certainly
be considered a blueprint for a strategic response for dealing with elDs. The
scheme developed in the U.S. government's document makes no specific
reference to websites which provide soft eDs through social networks and
social media. It does, however, greatly rely on mobile technology as perhaps a
tool which will facilitate authentication. 282
The scheme promoted by NSTIC includes many similarities to the one
offered in the eSig Directive (although, sadly, it makes no reference to it). It is
premised upon public-private collaboration 283 that will generate the above
mentioned "ecosystem." This scheme calls for the creation of an "accreditation
authority" to validate the systems and methods used by the various participants
in the "In ecosystem."284 If the relevant system is found to be in compliance
with a minimal standard, it will receive a "trustmark" which cannot be
2 76 As noted by the Head of the Task Force "Legislation Team (elDAS)" at the
European Commission, the elDAS regulation does not cover "soft ID" (e.g. Facebook), only
official elD. See Andrea Servida, Proposal for a Regulation on Electronic Identification and
Trust Services for Electronic Transactions in the Internal Market, IAS PROJECT 12-13, (June
4, 2012), http://www.iasproject.eu/attachments/File/Workshop_2/workshopIAS-_Servida.
pdf.
2 77 NSTIC REPORT, supra note 35, at 1-4; see also THE WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL
STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY, SECURITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED
WORLD 25 (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss viewer/in
ternational strategy-for cyberspace.pdf; A. Michael Froomkin, "PETs Must Be on a
Leash ": How US. Law (and Industry Practice) Often Undermines and Even Forbids
Valuable Privacy Enhancing Technology, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 965 (2013).2 78 NSTIC REPORT, supra note 35, at 2-3.
279Id at 2.
280Id. at 41.
281 The NSTIC project has also awarded funding to five pilot projects and issued calls
for additional pilots. See Happy NSTIC-iversary!, NSTIC NOTES (Apr. 17, 2013),
http://nstic.blogs.govdelivery.com/2013/04/17/happy-nstic-iversary/.2 82 NSTIC REPORT, supra note 35, at 25.2 83 Id at 9.
284Id. at 25.
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forged.285 This mark will act as a signal to users that the services should be
trusted.286 Not only will this system be secure and authenticated, and thus
minimize the concerns noted above, but it will also be interoperable (and thus
meet the second set of interests noted above).287 The report notes several times
that the scheme would be voluntary, and led by government.288 However, the
government will move to promote and encourage the use of measures operating
within the ecosystem, while relying upon its various capacities as purchaser and
user of technologies (such as in e-gov).289 In doing so, government will give
preference to technologies that are in compliance with standards set by the
NSTIC scheme.
As part of this project, the government will make additional strategic policy
moves. Among others, it will promote standards of technical conduct for the
operation of the identity intermediation process.290 Setting such a standard is an
interesting strategic move which might later be applied in other realms of the
law-such as by regulators that will mandate this standard, or by courts which
will see it as a threshold for acceptable conduct in this context. The report also
notes governmental influence in setting levels of liability for firms operating
within the ecosystem. 291 Clearly setting a low level of liability will prove to be
a powerful incentive to join this scheme (as it will provide firms operating
within it with a liability safe harbor).
Although this initiative is only taking its first steps, it is already generating
a vibrant discussion and some sharp criticism in the academic and policy world.
This discussion is of interest, as the arguments presented might also be applied
when considering the proper policy responses for soft elDs (and is yet another
benefit of incorporating these discussions into the themes addressed in this
Article). Michael Froomkin is skeptical of NSTIC and cautions against what he
views as steps which are part of a "second wave" of internet regulation.292 He
sees these initiatives as measures striving to undermine the extent of anonymity
available online. While these regulatory moves might seem innocuous at first
blush, they must be viewed as part of a broader historical trend. Froomkin notes
earlier moves in the mid-nineties, when governments tried to crack down on
internet anonymity by requesting backdoor access to encryption schemes (a
wave that ultimately mostly failed).293 Froomkin finds this second wave very
upsetting and fears it might succeed this time (as governments have learned
from their previous mistakes). 294 This time around, the government is not
285 Id. at 22.
286 Id.287 1d. at 13.288 NSTIC REPORT, supra note 35, at 3, 11.289 1d at 32.
290Id at 30-31.
291Id at 31.292 Froomkin, supra note 65, at 14-30.
293Id. at 7-12.
294Id. at 14-30.
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forcing private entities to provide access, but is setting up seductive voluntary
schemes which large commercial entities will feel obligated to join (possibly
because those participating in the scheme will receive tax breaks and
benefits). 295 The troubling outcome of this dynamic, according to Froomkin,
would be a system which allows government to uncloak the anonymity and
privacy of users-thus compromising important social values. 296 This
infrastructure could then be used to enable mass surveillance-a simple task for
governments given the fact that they assisted in planning this project's
infrastructure.
The Electronic Freedom Foundation (EFF) is also skeptical of this initiative
and begs caution.297 The EFF questions whether the government's strategy,
which calls for all identities to be controlled at one point, does not generate
greater (rather than fewer) security risks and vulnerabilities. Another concern is
that with a government controlled TD system,298 federal agents could be easily
issued false credentials so as to engage in surveillance. In other words, the ID
system will "vouch" that undercover agents are individuals the target might
know or trust, while in fact they are not.
VI. BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER: REGULATING SOFT EID
INTERMEDIARIES
After examining the definition, evolution, forms, benefits, and detriments of
soft elD and its intermediation, as well as noting EU and U.S. regulatory
frameworks which address similar issues, we now move to set forth a series of
recommendations for legal responses. Law can indeed move in several
directions. The somewhat passive/market-driven approach currently
implemented has contributed to great innovation and growth in the relevant
technology sectors. Yet as the multiple events noted above show, this came at a
price. Individuals suffered various harms as intermediaries were free to escape
liability and exercise broad discretion. It appears that economic forces are
leading platforms to take greater risks, namely risks to their users' identity
interests. In view of these developments, should other, strategic legal steps be
considered? The eSig Directive notes three such options: (1) mandatory
approval/supervision for identity intermediaries; (2) voluntary
approval/supervision for identity intermediaries; (3) tort liability.299 Some of
these responses were also echoed in the other contemplated policy regimes
noted above. In the next few pages we will examine the wisdom of adopting
these ideas in the context of soft identity intermediaries.
29 5 Id. at 11-12.
29 6 Id. at 40-41.
297 Lee Tien & Seth Schoen, Real ID Online? New Federal Online Identity Plan Raises
Privacy and Free Speech Concerns, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FouND. (July 20, 2010),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/07/real-id-online-new-federal-online-identity-plan.
298 Id
299 Directive 1999/93/EC, supra note 42, $T 13, 22, at 13.
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A. Mandatory Approval/Supervision for Identity Intermediaries
Should identity intermediaries whose overall operation goes beyond a
specific threshold (set while accounting for the amount of users, tasks, data
controlled, or other factors) be subjected to mandatory regulatory requirements?
Should they be treated similarly to Qualified Advanced Electronic Signature
Providers in the EU, or other entities which provide essential services and are
often subjected to this form of regulation? While this notion has some appeal, it
should be ultimately rejected, as it is a poor fit for this rapidly changing
technological environment.
In this context, an aggressive mandatory strategy might be justified on the
basis of three intuitive arguments, all noting that the mere reliance on tort
liability or voluntary compliance is insufficient. First (and as noted briefly
above), is the "collective action problem" argument. Users facing harms and
damages, for various reasons (mostly the limited prospect of compensation,
limited damages, and high litigation costs) 300 will not move to sue the
intermediaries. Thus, tort liability will provide insufficient incentives for
intermediaries to take proper steps to protect the users' interests and internalize
the harms they cause. 301 Second, the damages caused at this juncture due to the
intermediaries' actions and omissions are of great severity. They pertain to
important notions such as the sense of identity and self. In such cases, society
would be ill advised to merely rely on the forces of tort law to regulate
outcome. These forces might play out too slowly and ineffectively while the
social damage will persist. A similar argument motivates the introduction of
worker and car safety regulations which go beyond tort liability. Third, the
situation at hand might be one which generates great negative externalities. In
other words, soft elD intermediaries cause damages which go beyond their
users or other direct victims. For instance, reports on the various incidents
discussed above might deter individuals from participating in the online
discourse-and thus limit the important social benefits of the discourse and the
information flows it enables. Therefore, society cannot rely on those seeking
tort damages as a mechanism which will achieve an optimal social outcome.
While these three arguments have some merit, they do not carry sufficient
weight to overcome the substantial problems this regulatory strategy brings
about.
300 See discussion supra Part IV.C.
301 It should be noted that some of these "collective action" related concerns might be
mitigated given the specific context discussed-virtual identities which pertain to
individuals which are discussed in the online realm. The online realm enables cheap and
efficient collaboration and organization, and thus might allow for overcoming the high
coordination costs often noted in this context. For more on the strengths and possible limits
of online information flows, see Becher & Zarsky, supra note 71, at 320-33. In addition, one
might note that a common response to this collective action problem is allowing for "class
actions." As the damages here noted are very particular, one can question whether such a
strategy (which carries with it vast costs and detriments) will prove helpful.
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The prospects of the mandatory supervision scheme's success are not high,
to say the least. A slow-paced regulatory approval or even supervision scheme
will have a very difficult time keeping pace with new innovations which will be
constantly challenging the regulator's definitions and authority. What they
might indeed, inadvertently, end up achieving is a tax on innovation, as firms
strive to work around governmental regulation, or are blocked from adopting
new models.302 Yet the regulator's incompetence might turn out to be the least
of our troubles. The worst will follow when the regulator is corrupt, or at least
subjected to influence of interest groups. Here, existing powerful commercial
entities will strive to structure regulatory requirements to meet their current
capabilities, rather than the actual social needs. 303 Thus, not only will the
mandatory regulatory approach fail, but it will lead to unfair and inefficient
outcomes. Given this risk, such forms of mandatory schemes should probably
be avoided.
Finally, there is the delicate matter of enforcement. While most identity
intermediaries are U.S. companies today, there is no guarantee this will always
be the case. Even today's large U.S. Internet corporations might choose to move
their operations offshore so as to escape mandatory regulation. Attending to the
enforcement of technological standards with regard to multi-national Internet
companies is a complex, costly, and often futile matter. Therefore, perhaps
other options should be explored.
Before concluding this discussion, three short caveats are worth noting.
First, this argument can only pertain to "soft elDs" as defined above. If
identification features are central to the firm's business plan and showcase
prominently on their platform, business model, and marketing strategy, the
regulatory response might be different (and indeed as explained above, in the
EU, it already is or shortly will be).
Second, the arguments set forth here do not apply with equal force to all
forms of identity intermediation. It is fair to assume that, in some contexts, the
arguments for taking a more aggressive regulatory stance are stronger for Real
Names identities. As explained, the damages to both the relevant individual,
whose name or identity is abused, as well as to third parties who relied upon it,
tend to be greater.
Third, while mandatory standards set and enforced by government are a
problematic idea, there might be other ways for regulators to assure that identity
3 0 2 See JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS:
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 394 (2005) (explaining that
regulatory minimalists believe government intervention in the standard-setting process is
dangerous and that standards selected by regulators may be inferior to those emerging in the
marketplace); see also discussion in Michael I. Krauss, Regulations vs. Markets in the
Development ofStandards, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 781, 798-99 (1994).
303 For a discussion of this problem in the context of VOW regulation, see Susan P.
Crawford, The Ambulance, the Squad Car, and the Internet, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 873,
877-88 (2006); see also, in a broader telecom context, NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note
302, at 398-99. For a general discussion of this problem, see Krauss, supra note 302.
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intermediaries internalize the damages they inflict. For instance, the government
might consider the setting of fines to achieve this objective. These might be of
greatest relevance and importance with regard to Real Name identity
intermediaries, given the enhanced concerns they generate. We will return to
this "softer" form of regulation, and its difficulties, beloW. 304
B. Voluntary Approval/Supervision for Identity Intermediaries
As noted in the previous section, an interesting notion set forth both by
NSTIC and the eSig Directive in Europe is a voluntary supervision and
approval scheme by the government. While these noted initiatives do not
pertain to soft elDs, we must ask whether adopting such a strategic expansion to
the intermediaries here discussed is a wise choice. However, even though this
option sounds interesting, it can only have limited utility in this specific context.
The voluntary scheme works as a signaling mechanism. In other words,
firms complying with the governmental standard signal high quality and
reliability. The existence of the voluntary mechanism will allow firms to easily
distinguish themselves. It will also assist consumers in identifying quality and
risk, and in that way limit doubts and confusion. Therefore, users who seek to
protect the interests noted above (especially while using Real Names) might
only make use of or rely upon verified intermediaries. Others will be free to use
or rely upon communications with identities which did not receive (or even
seek) governmental approval, at their own risk.
On its face, the voluntary approval scheme could provide the benefits of the
previous mandatory option, without the problematic shortcomings. The process
does not necessarily chill innovation (or will do so to a much lesser extent), as
firms that find the process impeding on their technological and business plans
can simply choose to ignore it. These actions will also enhance overall trust in
such intermediation systems. Finally, they are clearly easier to enforce, as the
party voluntarily joining will hopefully cooperate, rather than raise
jurisdictional defenses.
Yet, one can easily argue that the benefits of such a voluntary scheme are
quite limited. At first, one can question whether a signal of compliance and
competence from government in the innovative and ever-changing realm of
identity intermediation is a factor users will find helpful and satisfying. Given
the known problems of governmental ignorance and incompetence, users might
be unimpressed when an intermediary has received a governmental stamp of
approval.
They might even be worried. Recall our previous discussion regarding
NSTIC and the thoughtful critiques set forth by both Michael Froomkin and the
304 Another mandatory strategy that might be applied is a breach notification
requirement for some of the breaches which cause the concerns noted. To some extent, this
notion has been adopted by the recent EU Proposal, Articles 15(2) and 15(3). Proposal for a
Regulation, supra note 271, arts. 15(2)-(3), at 27.
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EFF.305 Users might fear that governmental certification is not only an approval
of security, but approval of the intermediaries' compliance with the
government's various requests and needs-needs which might undermine the
users' privacy and autonomy. 306 For that reason, the governmental stamp of
authority might even be considered a "scarlet letter" for some cautious users.
Beyond these two arguments, users will probably ignore the governmental
signal of approval (or lack thereof) for yet another reason. The seductive pull of
many of the entities which incidentally generate "soft elDs" might lead users to
disregard the problematic aspects of identification. Much has been written about
the magnetic draw of social networking sites (SNS). 307 In some social circles,
social pressures almost force individuals to participate. These forces have
arguably led individuals to use platforms which provided a very limited form of
privacy protection. Such social pressures will most likely have a similar effect
upon the process of selecting soft elD intermediaries as well. To note a similar
example, commercial schemes to provide approval stamps of privacy protection
(through the use of privacy seals) have generally failed to provide a suitable
solution to the problems of online information privacy.308 It is fair to predict
that a similar dynamic will unfold with regard to approval (albeit, by the
government) for identity intermediaries.
Nonetheless, let us not close the book on this voluntary approval scheme so
quickly. While it would most likely fail as an effective signaling tool for users,
voluntary schemes might fulfill other strategic roles. For instance, the standards
set by government might either serve as a "safe harbor" or initiate another form
of signaling to courts when establishing the intermediary's liability and duty of
care for the harms discussed above. In other words, a governmental entity can
set standards which courts will later use when ruling on liability. In many
instances, regulators rather than courts will have the proper level of expertise to
30 5 See discussion supra Part V.B.
306 Recent reports regarding the NSA's activities (as allegedly leaked by Edward
Snowden) indicate that this agency has strived to deliberately weaken both national and
international encryption standards. Nicole Perlroth, Jeff Larson & Scott Shane, N.S.A Able
To Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2013, http://www.ny
times.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-intemet-encryption.html?pagewanted=3&hp.
307 See, e.g., Grimmelmann, supra note 92, at 1161 (with regard to joining the network
due to its size); see also id. at 1155 (with regard to adding "friends" who are not really
friends).
30 8 See, e.g., Anthony D. Miyazaki & Sandeep Krishnamurthy, Internet Seals of
Approval: Effects on Online Privacy Policies and Consumer Perceptions, 36 J. CONSUMER
AFF. 28, 34-37 (2002), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.11111/j.1745-
6606.2002.tb00419.x/abstract; see also Benjamin Edelman, Adverse Selection in Online
"Trust Certification" 5-8 (Oct. 15, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.
benedelman.org/publications/advsel-trust-draft.pdf (noting the ineffective role of certifiers
and how they are subjected to capture).
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address this issue and provide overall guidance to the industry.309 Yet to fully
understand this point, we must move to examine liability as a measure to
regulate soft elDs-a task we attend to now. 310
C. Identity Intermediaries and Tort Liability
As noted throughout this Article, the current U.S. legal setting has allowed
identity intermediaries to escape tort liability for various reasons. However, the
eSig Directive, as well as both NSTIC and proposed new European eIDAS
Regulation, address and to some extent set forth liability schemes for identity
intermediaries. Therefore, reexamining the role of tort liability for the actions
and omissions of the identity intermediaries is called for.
Overall, regulation through liability (or what we referred to above as a
"responsive" legal strategy) does not entail many of the concerns inflicting the
two regulatory options noted above. It does not allow government to closely
regulate technology as it places courts as a central mitigating player. In theory
at least, courts can examine whether these regulatory steps are merely measures
to entrench incumbents or advance various governmental objectives. This
scheme generates issues of enforceability-yet it is easier to enforce a monetary
judgment as opposed to compliance with a technical standard, even regarding
an offshore entity. This strategy, does, however, exacerbate problems of limited
expertise on the legal end. Courts are incapable of understanding new
technologies, much less steering them in the right direction. Thus, some form of
regulatory influence would be wise.
A full analysis as to implementing a proper tort regime in this context
requires addressing a variety of factors. Above all, we must attend to examining
whether such claims will be blocked by the current legal doctrine derived from
Section 230 of the CDA. 311 If so, should courts reinterpret the statute based on
legislative intent? And even if the answer to this last question is negative,
should the statute be amended? If so, in what way? Other questions we must
consider are whether liability should be assigned to these intermediaries
directly, or merely as contributing to the actions of a direct tortfeasor. Finally,
we must establish the most appropriate tort to be applied at this juncture, while
distinguishing among the different forms of victims noted above.312 Some of
309 This statement does not contradict those made above regarding the inability of
regulators to address this ever-changing context. While regulators face challenges, they are
in a better position to do so than courts.
310 This solution might allow courts to take into account the various noted problems with
certification mentioned above. It might also allow courts to set different standards for
different forms of intermediation, such as Real Names or Stable Pseudonyms.
311 An analysis of the role of Section 230 in this context might also call for examining
the difficult relation between marketing representations made by a firm regarding identity
intermediation, and the "immunity" section 230 provides. See discussion supra note 188.
312 One student note has offered the tort of "negligent enablement of imposter fraud."
Sterritt, supra note 11, at 1714-29.
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these questions were recently reflected upon in thoughtful student notes. 313
Given the limited confines of this Article, it would be impossible to do justice to
all these very difficult doctrinal questions. Any such discussion must also
confront an even broader question-whether the overall balance set out in
Section 230 is appropriate, or perhaps must be reconfigured altogether.
In the context of our limited discussion of tort liability for identity
intermediaries, what we try to achieve is far less ambitious. Approaching the
issue at a higher level of abstraction, our contribution would be first in
examining if liability should normatively be assigned to these powerful players.
Second, we strive to incorporate into this discussion the various distinctions set
out above. In other words, we find it somewhat unhelpful to discuss the role and
extent of liability in merely general terms. Rather, we believe that standards of
care and responsibility must be matched to different forms of intermediation
(Real Names vs. Stable Pseudonyms). We must also specifically address the
three forms of concerns noted above (ID hijacking, impersonation, and identity
misrepresentation) in our basic discussion of liability. The analysis thus creates
a two-by-three matrix, which strives to address every one of the six rubrics
separately. 314 In doing so, the analysis will generally assign a level of relative
standard of care, which could be compared to the other instances addressed in
the analysis.
It should be noted that the analysis also lacks a clear theoretical mapping of
the rationale for assigning tort liability in this context. Given the Article's
constraints, it generally points to intermediaries as entities capable (at times) of
limiting the risks of damages, and therefore the proper bearers of liability.315
Clearly a far more elaborate normative analysis is called for. Yet the insights
here discussed would prove helpful in mapping out an overall response to the
problems of identity intermediation.
A final introductory note goes to the role of the contractual language which
might govern some of the relationships between potential plaintiffs and the
relevant intermediary. As noted above,316 some of those injured by the
intermediaries' actions and omissions are in privity of contract with the identity
intermediary-governed by the terms of use signed when generating the
identity, and possibly reaffirmed every time the user enters the relevant
3 13 See id.; Wesley Burrell, Note, I Am He as You Are He as You Are Me: Being Able To
Be Yourself Protecting the Integrity of Identity Online, 44 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 705, 738-47
(2011).
3 14 See summary infra Table 1.
315 For general sources regarding this matter, see GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 139 (1970) (economic analysis); George P.
Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537, 537-44 (1972)
(fairness-based analysis); Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers
Accountable, 14 SUP. CT. EcoN. REv. 221, 222-48 (2006) (economic analysis of online
intermediaries).
3 16 See, e.g., Robinson v. Match.com, LLC, No. 3:10-cv-2651-L, 2012 WL 3263992, at
*5-8 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2012).
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platform. As part of this contractual framework, users often waive their rights to
bring actions regarding many of the claims we will now discuss. Therefore,
liability will also be governed by the contractual framework pertaining to the
parties. The problem, however, is that this contractual framework is rarely
negotiated fairly. The contracts themselves are those of adhesion, presented to
users on a "take it or leave it" basis. Furthermore, given the concentrated nature
of some of the markets for SNS and related products, users cannot properly
exercise their "leave it" option. In addition, it might even seem that whether the
relationship in the relevant case is governed by contract is most of all a product
of chance.
Therefore, at some points, the analysis below will disregard the specific
nature of the contracts set among the parties and assume that even if liability
will be limited contractually, courts should set these provisions aside. By
ignoring the nature of the contracts, we are taking an informed legal position;
we recognize the need for limiting the enforcement of these relevant provisions
in the identity intermediaries' terms of use. However, at times, courts should
refrain from intervening in the agreed-upon legal framework. In these instances,
markets will sort out liability, in accordance with the contractual framework
governing the parties. Here, market forces and the potential of negative political
backlash from imbalanced provisions would suffice in assuring that these
contractual waivers are fair and balanced.
1. The Liability Matrix
a. ID Hacking
As explained above, the damages resulting from this concern are inflicted
upon the user whose ID was hacked, and on a third party who (wrongfully)
relied upon such a hacked persona. While many ID hacks and breaches result
from the sophistication of the attacker and negligence of the user, many others
are caused by an insecure infrastructure set in place by the soft eTD
intermediary. Intermediaries could limit these forms of risks by requiring
stronger passwords, engaging in advanced forms of authentication and
verification, as well as tightening up their overall infrastructure security.
Clearly, however, setting a high standard of care at this juncture will
generate additional costs which will, no doubt, be passed on to all users.
Usability of the overall system will probably suffer as well given the installation
of additional security measures. Nonetheless, this high standard is called for at
this juncture to assure that this concern would be minimized by a party who is
quite capable of doing so--the soft identity intermediary.
A high standard of care should indeed be applied in instances where the
relevant soft elD is a Real Name. Here, damages to both identity users and third
parties are substantial. The ease with which such an identity could be linked to
the offline realm enhances the damages and thus the platforms' responsibility.
However, liability (while relying on a somewhat lower standard of care, given
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the differences noted above) should still be assigned to identity intermediaries
enabling Stable Pseudonyms. Here too, users and third parties may suffer
damages related to the loss of control over an extension of the self, as well as
reliance upon an assumedly trusted persona.
A very difficult question arising in this context is whether a different
standard must be set for damages related to Real Names applied in either a
mandatory or voluntary scheme. Contradicting arguments could be set forth.
Intermediaries applying mandatory Real Name schemes should perhaps be
subjected to a higher standard of conduct because they do not allow their users
to select an option which will allow such users to limit the risks of online hacks.
On the other hand, when applying a voluntary scheme, one might argue that in
this context, individuals specifically opt for a real name, clearly signaling their
expectation that the security of their persona would be maintained. This might
also be the expectation of third parties relying upon voluntary (as opposed to
mandatory) IDs. It is also quite difficult to predict how the market will react to
different levels of liability for these two different forms. Given our discussion
above, it is challenging to establish which form of intermediation is normatively
superior (and thus should receive a higher level of protection). For these
reasons, perhaps a mandatory/voluntary liability-based distinction should not be
made at this juncture, but only after additional study. This analytical point
pertains to the subsequent segments of the analysis as well (and thus will not be
repeated).
Finally, one might argue that setting the relatively high standard level here
noted might provide a substantial disincentive to firms, who will thereafter
refrain from offering (or mandating) the Real Names option. Such a concern is
probably misplaced. Firms have many incentives to provide for this option-as
it generates benefits in terms of the personal data they may collect and the
advertising value they may reap. 317 A higher standard of care would not
dampen the appetite for these identification measures.
b. Impersonation
With regard to this potential concern of identity intermediation, it is first
important to note that the distinction between this and the previous example is
somewhat delicate and easily overlooked. The damages caused at this juncture
to both the relevant individual impersonated and third parties are very similar to
those noted above (yet as explained both the sense of losing control as well as
the actual damages in this instance are usually less severe). However, the steps
to be taken by an identity intermediary to limit these harms are very different.
Here, the direct tortfeasor does not "hack" an existing account, but starts an
account using the name of another. To mitigate harms related to impersonation,
elD intermediaries can engage in user verification prior to opening a Real Name
account. They may, for instance, rely on other established verification methods
317 See Edwards, supra note 94, at 9, and accompanying text.
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(as Amazon makes use of credit cards) to limit impersonation ex ante. They can
also rely on recommendations of other users (similar to the way Facebook
allows for the indication of an impersonating account) ex post. The options for
doing so are endless. Identity intermediaries, however, have only limited
motivation to engage in these activities and thus liability should be assigned.
As noted above, assigned liability generates problematic outcomes. Beyond
the costs, a strict level of liability will motivate firms to apply aggressive
measures to limit this form of impersonation. As this Article's opening example
demonstrates, such steps might also lead to harms and aggravation to various
users. They also require identity intermediaries to collect even more personal
data. Applying various aggressive measures to limit this concern might even
generate unjust distributions; the high costs of proving one's true identity upon
registration might limit the access of specific, weaker segments of the
population (for instance, individuals without credit cards) to these powerful
tools of speech and discourse. For this reason, the threshold of care in this
context should be lower than the one applied in the previous segment.
At this point again, the distinction between Real Names and Stable
Pseudonyms must be noted and leads to different legal conclusions.
Impersonation clearly generates harms when a Real Name is applied. In such a
context, liability should be assigned, as discussed. Yet finding liability when
merely Stable Pseudonyms are impersonated might be unwise. Indeed users of a
stable and known "handle" could be harmed when others assume their name-
and third parties might also rely on such a misrepresentation. Their reputation
might be tarnished and they will suffer from their inability to express
themselves while using this virtual persona in all realms. However, recognizing
this form of liability might come at too high a cost. For firms to protect
themselves sufficiently, they might be required, upon authorizing the usage of
every new Stable Pseudonym, to examine whether it is being used by others in
different platforms. Such an inquiry will be complex and not always fruitful.
Thus, here liability in the context of Stable Pseudonyms should be limited,
perhaps only established by market forces; firms will only be subjected to the
contractual obligations they specifically undertake.
A final point regarding this issue calls for an exception to liability. In some
rare cases, impersonation of celebrities must be allowed, as it can prove to be
powerful and important form of criticism. In many instances it is quite clear that
the Pope, President Obama, or Bill Gates is not using specific profiles given the
nature of the content or other elements. Thus, they will not suffer from an
identity-related harm. 318
c. Identity Misrepresentation
In this final scenario, damages (and thus the liability that might follow) do
not inflict users of the intermediation process, but third parties who relied upon
3 18 See Ramasastry, supra note 159; see also discussion supra note 176.
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the identity-based misrepresentations the intermediaries enabled. While these
damages are severe, they might be countered by social norms which call for
treating much of the information conveyed by people one never met in person
(or have limited prior connections with) skeptically and with caution.
Generating liability for platforms in the case of reliance on such inaccurate
information and misperceived identity will in fact require platforms to find
ways to limit these forms of misrepresentation. Here, although the damages are
somewhat different, the reaction is similar to the one noted above (with regard
to impersonation). Intermediaries will be required to examine, upon registration,
whether the identity used online reflects the one applied offline. The main
difference between these cases being that, in this latter case, there is no
individual who can step forward and complain that his or her persona was
abused. This renders authentication challenging, even for the prudent
intermediary (a factor to be accounted for when considering the intermediary's
diligence). Note that for this discussion, we merely focus on the authentication
of "identity" as narrowly defined (the individual's name), rather than other
factors that might enable identification.
At this juncture, and given the limited damages which only pertain to third
parties (who could limit such damage by engaging in cautious behavior) one
must question whether indeed setting even a moderate standard of care is called
for. As noted above, the measures intermediaries will take to limit this risk
might be viewed as intrusive. In addition, to adequately set the level of care and
liability, referring to the Real Name/Stable Pseudonym distinction can prove
helpful. For Real Names, a similar level of care to the one addressed in the
previous segment (regarding impersonation) is called for. After all, the steps
required to limit these two risks are quite similar-matching identification
information with the online persona.
Yet things are quite different when facing intermediation of Stable
Pseudonyms. If liability is set, the intermediary will be facing an almost
impossible task of limiting these risks. To do so, the intermediary might be
required to examine and investigate private identity information pertaining to a
pseudonymous user-a task which even sounds like a contradiction in terms.
These inquiries will indirectly inhibit the online discourse. Individuals will fear
that their presentations would be subjected to examination and inquiries by the
platforms, and thus limit their exchanges. It is also unclear whether platforms
are well equipped to achieve these objectives. In addition, it will prove quite
difficult to distinguish between the authentication of "identity" and the
abundance of other factors used as part of such intermediation (which are
beyond the scope of this analysis and require a different set of balances).
Therefore, in the interest of mitigating privacy and security concerns (and
allowing for some form of anonymous discourse), liability is best limited at this
latter juncture. Furthermore, given the low level of reliance, this context should
allow deference to the contractual framework set forth by the relevant
platforms.
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It should be noted that, nonetheless, some platforms move to address these
issues in various ways. In some contexts, they strive to assure that presentations
made by their users are accurate. They sanction users (at times by removing
them from the service) when they present inaccurate identity-related
information. Platforms include relevant provisions in their user agreements to
enable such actions. We believe they should be allowed to do so and act upon
them. Courts, however, will have an important role in assuring that platforms
carry out such internal policing fairly. They must limit the firms' discretion and
allow users to explore, when such actions do not generate harm, the limits and
borders of virtual identity structuring.
Table 1: Summary ofLiability Recommendations
ID Hacking Impersonation Identity
Misrepresentation
Intermediate Standard
of Care
Real Name Care Standard of Care (yet lesser damages
given lower social
expectations)
Limited Liability - No Liability
Market Forces +Intermediate Cor(t upes (greater deference toStable Pseudonym Court SupervisionStandard of Care contractual
of ContractualFramework framework)
2. Setting a Standard: Courts or Regulators?
While the discussion above provided some basic benchmarks regarding the
forms of liability and standards of care to be set at various junctures, we must
further inquire as to how courts will establish whether the intermediaries have
acted suitably. Usually, the court's opinion is formulated after examining the
facts at hand and possibly the opinions of experts. These will inform the court
as to the state of the art, and the way it relates to the actual practices applied.
Yet the advanced technological setting here discussed might be a poor fit
for such a legal practice. Courts are ill equipped to interpret these situations
properly, especially after the fact. In addition, the mostly general and vague
rules set by courts will impede the firms' ability to structure and update
technological interfaces given legal uncertainty. Therefore, and as explained
above, even when opting for a liability-based regime for regulating soft identity
intermediaries, law can take a strategic stand by indicating the acceptable level
of technological standards.
Here again, the ideas noted in EU law might prove helpful, but with
somewhat of a twist. Rather than setting a mandatory or voluntary regime in
place, regulators can set a "safe harbor" form of identity intermediation-both
for the security and the verification tasks. These rules can serve as a minimal
standard of behavior and care, later to be used by courts approaching the issues
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noted above. In addition, a breach of such a minimal standard might also lead to
fines, thus resolving some of the issues noted in Part IV.B. 1 supra. In
conclusion, although this solution calls for a somewhat reactive role for law,
which is led by courts, additional strategic steps for regulators serve as an
important supplement to this overall legal response.
D. Legal Strategies To Enhance Property/Publicity Rights
The law can also play a role in resolving this second set of concerns, and on
various levels. As the eSig and other newer regulatory and technological
ventures indicate, the law may respond by directly encouraging mobility and
interoperability. Law could set mandatory or voluntary standards, delineating
ways in which these important objectives should be achieved. The law can also
play an active role in enhancing the individual's property/public interest by
limiting the intermediaries' ability to terminate the user account.
For reasons noted above in various contexts (regarding the risk and futility
of directly regulating technology by government), we find these somewhat
aggressive steps unwise. Governments are poorly positioned to force firms into
engaging in mobility and interoperability in this context, or to note what forms
of termination are unacceptable. Yet there are "softer" and less intrusive ways
in which the law can enhance mobility and interoperability, and thus the
property/personality rights related to identity.319 As Randy Picker notes, at
times third parties strive to provide users with either the mobility or
interoperability experience. 320 They do so by creating technological solutions
which facilitate such services while piggybacking on the intermediaries'
systems. 321 These initiatives can enhance the user interests here discussed. The
powerful intermediaries are however less than pleased with these forms of
innovative developments. They strive to block such initiatives both
technologically and legally. To do so, they prohibit the use of these measures in
their terms of use and sanction users who do not comply (at times by
terminating their accounts). 322
At this point, Picker observes, law can intervene.323 Courts can find that
these contractual terms (or in other instances, attempts to rely upon property or
IP rights) are enforced in bad faith, and require the intermediaries to enable
319 For a similar argument, see Ruben Rodrigues, Privacy on Social Networks: Norms,
Markets, and Natural Monopoly, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: PRIVACY, SPEECH, AND
REPUTATION 237, 246-49 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010).
3 20 Randal C. Picker, Competition and Privacy in Web 2.0 and the Cloud, 103 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1, 6-8 (2008), available at http://www.1aw.northwestem.edullawreview/colloquy/2008/
25/LRColl2008n25Picker.pdf.
321 Id
322 See discussion regarding the use of the Plaxo screen scraper by a Facebook user, the
fact that this practice constituted a breach of Facebook's terms of service, and Facebook's
termination of the user's account thereafter. See Grimmelmann, supra note 92, at 1198.
323 Picker, supra note 320, at 11-12.
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these interoperability/mobility-via-third-parties activities. 324 Courts can actively
refrain from upholding contractual provisions which aim to inhibit the
developing of tools for transferring information to other platforms or allowing
these platforms to interact. While Picker makes this argument in the antitrust
context, a similar argument for limiting the reach of these contractual and legal
provisions could be premised upon identity interests as well. This, in fact, might
be the extent of the proper role for law in promoting identity interests at this
juncture. In doing so, courts should also distinguish between Real Name and
Stable Pseudonym-based intermediation. As explained above, it is the latter
case in which users require greater protection, and thus courts should be more
aggressive in allowing third parties to enable interoperability and mobility (and
remove contractual and technological obstacles intermediaries might set in
place to block them).
Courts (and thus the law, in its responsive capacity) can also play an
important role in limiting the firm's ability to unilaterally terminate user
accounts, while noting the identity interests articulated above. Again, in doing
so, courts should provide greater protection to Stable Pseudonyms. At least in
one case (that of Bragg) this was precisely the position the court took.325
To conclude, here the proper role for law is responsive, rather than
strategic. The law should probably not lead the way in a move to promote these
identity interests in the soft elD context, but allow third parties to enhance the
users' autonomy. Yet the government can promote the identity interests noted
while assuming an educational role as well. Regulators, for instance, can
promote awareness of the ways in which platforms enable or inhibit
interoperability and mobility or tend to terminate accounts. For instance,
regulators may introduce a disclosure format which platforms must follow, and
clearly report on the extent of mobility, interoperability, and termination to their
users and the public in general. These and other disclosure and educational
initiatives might prove constructive in promoting the discussed identity-based
objectives by either third parties or the intermediaries' direct competitors. They
might also inhibit intermediaries from taking such aggressive actions in
advance, as they would fear the repercussions of such public "shaming."
VII. CONCLUSION: WHAT Is NEXT FOR ONLINE INTERMEDIARIES?
This Article chose to address the legal response to a specific novel issue-
soft ellD intermediation. However, the discussion above could not do this matter
justice. A discussion of identity intermediation is both over- and under-
inclusive. It is over-inclusive, as regulating these intermediaries calls for
discussing the acceptable level of privacy and security protection-an issue
which was intentionally overlooked yet must be integrated into any policy
discussion carried out at this juncture. The same could be said regarding the
324 See Kahn, supra note 137, at 227-28.
325 See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 608 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
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lack of a discussion as to the problems of "hate speech," "identity theft," and
"cyber bullying" 326-all dynamics enabled by the identity intermediation
process and overlooked in this analysis. Policy decisions addressing how these
troubling issues should be approached will no doubt impact the way the law
regulates identity intermediation and intermediaries.
Our discussion is under-inclusive as well. Discussing the notion of the
identity intermediaries' liability and responsibility is merely a segment of a
broader set of rules governing the digital environment. The identity
intermediaries are at times powerful market players. Thus, regulating their
identity intermediation capacities must be part of an overall competition law
strategy for dealing with these dominant online entities. Furthermore, identity
intermediaries are "online intermediaries." Thus, their regulation is part of an
overall debate as to the level of scrutiny (or immunity) online intermediaries
and platforms must be subjected to. 327 Only after approaching these broader
notions, can the proper regulation of this specific matter of identity
intermediation be finalized.
Yet with all its flaws, the discussion above provides important insights. It
generates an overall mapping of the issues related to identity intermediation,
and allows policy makers to prioritize among them. The key to the regulator's
success in the digital age is in properly selecting battles worth fighting-as
every battle requires substantial force, manpower, and attention-as well as
concessions made in other contexts. The analytical structure provided above can
prove helpful in setting forth a regulatory agenda with short and long term
goals.
Above all and as noted at several points throughout this Article, identity
intermediation raises intriguing questions which call for additional examination
and analysis. We hope this Article provides a helpful contribution for beginning
this inquiry and achieving a better understanding of the benefits and challenges
of soft elDs and their intermediaries in the years to come.
326 See Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 1966, 111th Cong. §§ 2-3
(2011), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/1I1/hrl966/text (this bill was not
enacted).
327 For a discussion of Section 230 in this context, see David S. Ardia, Free Speech
Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 373 (2010).
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